WASHINGTON, D.C. — This week, Rep. Carlos Gimenez (R-FL), chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, held a hearing to assess the growing homeland security threats stemming from the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or drones, in foreign conflicts. Read more in the Washington Free Beacon via Andrew Kerr here.
 
Witnesses highlighted the need to reform counter-UAS authorities, how America’s adversaries might weaponize drones in the homeland or against U.S. assets abroad, the risks posed by drones in our airspace that have been manufactured by adversaries like China, and what policymakers can do to ensure we do not fall behind as we continue to develop our own drone technology. 
 
Witness testimony was provided by Tom Walker, founder and CEO of DroneUP; Brett Feddersen, vice president of strategy and government affairs at D-Fend Solutions; Church Hutton, chief growth officer at AeroVironment, Inc.; and Michael Robbins, president and CEO of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International. 

Subcommittee Chairman Gimenez asked whether airports are prepared to handle drone threats: 
 
“If a drone, an AI drone, were to interfere or incur into an airport…would that airport have the authority to deal with it in a kinetic fashion in a way to knock it down in whatever way? If you can’t do it through signal interruption, is there any way that airport—does it have the authority to bring it down, even though they may not know it poses an unbelievable risk to their passengers?”
 
Robbins answered: 
 
“No, sir. We do not have that authority… In a very limited fashion, the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Energy have the authority to mitigate a rogue drone, but it’s not a standing authority. They can’t just be doing that all of the time. The way Congress has restricted the authority at the moment has to go through a very specific approval process and requires a very high-level signature, usually at the deputy secretary level or higher.”

Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Chairman Andrew Garbarino (R-NY) asked about the risk opposed by drones manufactured by adversaries: 
 
“I’m especially concerned about the potential for foreign manufactured drones to be exploited by adversaries to carry out cyber-physical attacks against critical systems. Many U.S. law enforcement and municipal agencies continue DJI drones despite security warnings from the Department of Homeland Security and CISA. From your perspectives, what are the cyber risks posed by these platforms and do you believe agencies understand the surveillance or data exfiltration vulnerabilities they may be exposing themselves to?”
 
Feddersen answered:
 
“We know it’s happened several times. Anything that can connect Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or anything that connects even on the LTE bands can inject some type of virus or some type of security vulnerability into the system. This is something that I know the interagency is aware of. They’re trying to address it, but when it comes from all the different threat factors out there, a cyberattack from a drone tends to fall low on the list. It’s not that it shouldn’t be up on the list or it shouldn’t be considered, it’s just a priority-based aspect of things. But we know the potentials there, we know it’s been used in the past.”

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Chairman August Pfluger (R-TX) asked about keeping up with the drone technology that our adversaries and allies are developing:

“This weekend and last week’s tragedies that happened in Texas, which we were involved in, had several local and state law enforcement officials reach out and say, ‘What are we going to do?’ Because the Chinese-made technology is allowing them to do things like search and rescue, but obviously we are concerned about that and we have stated those concerns in this hearing room for at least two, maybe three, or four years… How do we go faster? How do we get to a point where we can keep up with that technology? And then I’ll go to Mr. Hutton on the conversation of Ukraine, which I’ve spent a lot of time studying. The iterative nature of the drones that we are seeing in that conflict is quite alarming and I’m not sure that we’re keeping up, so it’s kind of in the same vein of what I mentioned about some of our law enforcement needs. What features of these drones raise concern of similar tactics, techniques, and procedures being used here against us––whether it be critical infrastructure military bases or the like?”

Hutton answered:

“Not just the technology, but also the tactics, techniques, and procedures are iterating at an incredibly fast pace… The Operation Spider Web in Ukraine demonstrated the control of small UAS with kinetic payloads at 2,000 miles distance, indicating that you wouldn’t even have to be in the United States or even on this side of the planet to conduct and execute a terrorist attack against U.S. critical infrastructure.”

Chairman Pfluger asked about policies to consider when working to counter drone threats:

“What resources do we need, we do not have right now, to both protect against some sort of critical infrastructure, military, or even civilian type attack, and what do we need to think about legislatively?”

Hutton answered: 

“You need a common integrated air picture. Three companies before you all make competitive products in this space. There is a supply of this capability. Who would run that air picture? … It would have to be delegated down to the operational users using a set of standards and certifications and validations provided for by the federal government.”

Walker answered:

“It’s easier to hide in a crowd. Drones in our airspace right now outnumber manned aircraft 4 to 1. That’s going to double by 2027. That’s going to double again by 2030. So as we’re talking about the ability to defend against these threats we have to equally be thinking about how do we quickly identify those threats. I know I sound like a broken record on that but that’s going to become much more concerning and much more of a challenge because we have to remember of those drones in the air, 99% or better of them are performing real valuable missions that are saving and protecting American lives.”

Robbins answered:

“The congressional rules have not been updated since 2018. Expand airspace awareness detection technology very broadly and expand the mitigation tools more narrowly with vigorous training and oversight of that program.”

Rep. Sheri Biggs (R-SC) asked about the effects of unauthorized drone flights at military facilities, airports, and maritime ports:
 
“What are some of the direct impacts of unauthorized drone overflights at military facilities, airports, and maritime ports. Specifically for airports and maritime ports, could you explain the potential, the cascading effects that such incidents could or may have regionally or even nationwide?”
 
Robbins answered:
 
“First and foremost, obviously there’s with each incident the potential for there being some sort of a catastrophic event. Thankfully, as mentioned we haven’t seen that in the United States yet, but we have seen it overseas as the topic of this overall hearing how drone warfare abroad is changing… This is no longer a technology problem. The technology is in place. These three companies, as well as others, all have the ability to offer the protection to all the different sites that you listed, but Congress hasn’t updated the rules since 2018. Obviously, the landscape and the threat environment has changed dramatically, and it’s incumbent upon you as lawmakers to give federal officials more authorities and to be able to delegate those authorities with proper training and oversight to local [and] state police as well.”

Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ) asked about the impact of a drone swarm at events like the upcoming 2026 FIFA World Cup:
 
“I talked about the average stadium for the World Cup holding about 75,00[0] civilians. Have you guys done any analysis on what a drone swarm could do to that many citizens just watching a soccer game?”
 
Hutton answered: 
 
“We know from lessons learned in Eastern Europe exactly what would happen. You could put all of them at risk—every one of them.”

In his opening statement, Feddersen explained what the federal government can do to defend the homeland against drone threats, emphasizing the importance of counter-UAS systems: 
 
“I strongly urge the subcommittee and the full committee to take immediate action to meaningful bipartisan legislation. The industry, public safety professionals, and American public are calling for three simple actions that can be taken now to make Americans and our skies safer. Expand authorities to state local law enforcement and trained security professionals guarding our critical infrastructure. Develop and implement a counter-UAS training program using federally accredited curriculum and provide dedicated funding programs that enable critical infrastructure operators to procure, train, deploy, and operate counter-UAS systems.”

In his opening statement, Walker discussed the threats facing U.S. airspace:

“Today our airspace faces an urgent threat. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, the FAA recorded more than 400 illegal drone incursions over U.S. airports, representing a 25% increase over the same period last year. The military documented or reported 350 unauthorized flights over more than 100 bases. These are not isolated events. They are growing, sustained, and increasingly malicious. In one case, persistent hostile drone activity forced the relocation of F-22 Raptors at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. Despite weeks of investigation by the Pentagon, the FBI, and NASA, the operators were never identified.”

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