WASHINGTON, D.C. — This week, the House Committee on Homeland Security held a hearingto examine how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) undermines U.S. sovereignty through its use of espionage, transnational repression, pre-positioning in our critical infrastructure, intellectual property theft, supply chain dominance, and more. 

Testimony was provided by Dr. Michael Pillsbury, senior fellow in China strategy at the Heritage Foundation; Bill Evanina, founder and CEO of the Evanina Group and former director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center; Craig Singleton, senior director of the China Program and senior fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; and Rush Doshi, Ph.D., assistant professor of the Security Studies Program at the Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service.

In his opening statement, Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement Chairman Michael Guest (R-MS) underscored the threat posed by the CCP:
 
“The CCP’s ultimate aim is not to enjoy a peaceful balance of power with the West, but to establish its position as the dominant world power. A world oriented around the vision and values of the CCP would look very different from the unparalleled freedom and prosperity produced by the Pax Americana. In contrast, the Chinese vision would mean a global order subordinate to the desires and the interest of a totalitarian communist regime. In recent years the People’s Republic of China has engaged in sustained campaigns of transnational repression, intellectual property theft, and espionage here in the United States. Over the past four years, there have been more than 60 espionage cases across 20 states linked to the CCP. Operations to gather intelligence on sensitive military information and the theft of technology and trade secrets. Just this past December, a Chinese citizen was arrested for flying a drone over Vandenberg Space Force Base in California. He was apprehended at the airport, trying to board a flight back to China.” 

In his opening statement, Singleton detailed the strategy used by the CCP to steal our intellectual property: 
 
“First, Chinese actors relentlessly penetrate U.S. networks and critical infrastructure, harvesting vast troves of sensitive data in the process. Recently exposed Chinese state-sponsored hacking campaigns, Salt, Volt, and Flax Typhoon, reveal how Beijing exploits software vulnerabilities, implants malicious code, and maintains persistent backdoors. More than a year after these breaches became public, Chinese hackers still enjoy near-persistent access to U.S. telecommunications networks, with Washington yet to impose any meaningful costs. But hacking and data theft are just the opening gambit. 
 
“Beijing’s secondary goal is to systematically pre-position itself within our networks to degrade or disrupt them at critical junctures, both in peace and in conflict. By embedding compromised cranes in U.S. ports, Chinese made lidar devices in traffic control or drones that seamlessly integrate with civilian and military operations, Beijing gains a silent veto over our crisis response. Whether through biotech innovations or batteries powering our grid, each dependency forms market reliance into a strategic liability. In times of tension, the mere suspicion that these systems might be sabotaged could erode confidence, delay U.S. responses, and undermine our deterrent posture. 
 
“Third, China profits from this dual approach. Chinese high-tech exports from advanced sensors and biotech to drones and surveillance cameras generate billions in revenue every year for Beijing. This revenue is funneled back into military civil fusion programs, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of power. What’s more, by converting market access into geopolitical leverage, the CCP has weaponized Western dependence on its technologies, thereby undercutting U.S. competitiveness. 
 
“In response to these provocations, it’s vital that policymakers act with both urgency and clarity. By levying meaningful penalties, including robust outbound investment screening, targeted export controls, and stringent procurement bands on high-risk Chinese technologies, Washington can deny Xi the leverage he seeks and compel China to reassess its aggressive posture. If we fail to act, every hacked network, every compromised supply chain, and every dependency engineered by Beijing only heightens our vulnerability to disruption, sabotage, or even systemic failure during a crisis.”

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX)asked witnesses to detail how the CCP exploits American higher education:

“Talking about the Confucius Institutes––I’ve had a lot of legislation on this, [and] done a lot of work on Confucius Institutes. I’m very worried still that the Chinese Communist Party uses Confucius Institutes and other entities to hijack our intellectual property, to steal technologies––to do a variety of things that are detrimental to us. So, what I’d like to ask you is, given the strategy of the military civil fusion, what steps do you think the U.S. should be taking to prevent them from exploiting academic universities and using the CI kind of strategies?”

Singleton answered:

“Confucius Institutes used to number over about 120 across the United States. There are less than about 14 today, but they didn’t actually go anywhere. They just rebranded and renamed themselves. Now, they go by other names that are even harder to track. What’s worse is we see the proliferation of these Chinese controlled outreach programs at the K-12 level across the United States. Again, no coordination, control, or mandating requirement for any of these things. Beyond the concerns about free speech encroachment, beyond some of the ideological reservations we should have about what’s being taught in these classrooms and to our students, there are real research risks. Primarily, it’s because when you open some of these or establish some of these research partnerships and the academic exchanges, they all come together. So, as we looked, at the Foundation for Defensive Democracies, at all of the Confucius Institute contracts, they mandate research partnerships in cutting edge emerging fields, typically between Chinese universities supporting China’s military and our university system. Beyond that, we have to be pretty concerned about free speech on campus. There’s ample evidence from the FBI and others showing that Confucius Institutes are used to suppress free speech and to organize protests against speakers, including the Dalai Lama, who come to U.S. universities to speak about human rights in China.”

Rep. Andy Ogles (R-TN)asked witnesses to address how China uses social initiatives to undermine the United States:

“Mr. Pillsbury, you co-edited the Heritage Foundation’s report, ‘Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for countering China.’ It notes that there is growing evidence that Beijing is co-opting divisive ESG and DEI initiatives to undermine U.S. competitiveness. What do you believe are the implications of those efforts?” 

Pillsbury answered:

“Well, they’re very scary. If they succeed, we lose our global primacy. We lose all the benefits of being the world leader, and I doubt that we can get it back.”

Rep. Ogles continued:

“Well, you hit on an important point. I think sometimes we get distracted with the media cycle and perhaps what’s going on the European continent––which is important of course. But when we look at the existential threats to the United States and our supremacy globally, whether that’s militarily or economically speaking, would it be fair to say, or at least it’s my assessment, that China would be the adversary that we should be most concerned about?”

Pillsbury answered:

“Yes, I think so.” 

Rep. Sheri Biggs (R-SC) asked witnesses to describe the risks of Chinese-controlled global telecommunications infrastructure:
 
“Do you agree that the United States has a national security interest in ensuring that the global telecommunications core infrastructure is not controlled by a hostile state actor like Huawei?”
 
Singleton answered:
 
“I think it’s probably the defining challenge of the 21st century. It’s going to be figuring out who controls the means of communication, whether it’s TikTok, whether it’s telecommunications networks, whether it’s basic standards for emerging technologies––that will probably be the defining challenge. And whoever wins will control the drivers of the 21st century industrial revolution.”
 
Rep. Biggs continued:
 
“So, in your professional opinion, what do you think the new Trump administration––what could we do about that?”
 
Singleton answered:
 
“The America First investment policy that the White House released about two weeks ago was a tremendous roadmap and offered so much opportunity for Congress to be thinking of through codifying through law steps, whether it’s outbound investment screening, enhanced export controls, severing China’s ability to make greenfield investments in the United States to purchase farmland. I think it was the roadmap that Congress could follow, and I think there would be tremendous bipartisan support for nearly every single one of the measures in that policy.”

Rep. Ryan Mackenzie (R-PA) highlighted how the CCP exploits loopholes to conduct business with the U.S. military:
 
“The Communist Party of China is investing in certain companies that seem to be strategic investments in sometimes parent companies, where then the subsidiaries or part companies of those larger entities are actually providing defense, investment, and equipment, and technology for our U.S. military. So, I would like to hear from any of the panelists if they have seen this kind of activity and what their thoughts are on what we should be doing to address it.” 
 
Evanina answered:
 
“I think that’s a very deep and introspective question about the commonplace tactics the Communist Party have used, not only in the corporate sector, but in the defense and industrial base. I think the way you laid out that scenario is commonplace, and I think if you see one example of that, whether it be subsidiary, a supply chain vendor––you’re going to see that a thousand times across. It’s true to their form, how they do it, how they penetrate, how they facilitate––they get access, whether it be architectural plans, or just access to an IT system.”
 
“We have to be more effective and efficient with our industrial defense base, big companies, and have them force similar cyber hygiene practices all the way down through their supply chain to be able to prevent that from happening again and again. We just saw, recently, some cases in the news where you had small vendors who were supplying critical technologies to the defense industrial base, who were being owned and operated by Communist Party of China personnel. That’s simple due diligence [that] we could be more effective and efficient at defeating.”

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