WASHINGTON, D.C. — This week, House Committee on Homeland Security Vice Chairman Michael McCaul (R-TX), chairman of the bipartisan Task Force on Enhancing Security for Special Events in the United States, held a hearing to assess historical incidents and attacks at sporting events, concerts, and other mass gatherings in anticipation of upcoming high-profile, international events on U.S. soil. The inaugural hearing examined the unique security challenges inherent to mass-spectator events, as well as best practices for those forthcoming, including: the 2026 World Cup, the 2028 Summer Olympics and Paralympics, and the United States’ 250th anniversary. Read Chairman McCaul’s op-ed in the Washington Times here.

Witness testimony was provided by Sheriff Rosie Cordero-Stutz of the Miami-Dade County Sheriff’s Office; Ed Davis, former police commissioner for the Boston Police Department; Col. Robert Hodges, superintendent for the Louisiana State Police; and Chief Stacey Graves of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department.
 
In the hearing, witnesses and members called for expanding counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) authorities to help state and local law enforcement track and counter malicious drone use at these events, as well as potential threats to critical infrastructure. Additionally, members detailed the importance of coordination and information sharing between the federal government, law enforcement partners, and emergency managers during security preparations and in the event of a threat to the public at these events. In their testimony, former Commissioner Davis, Chief Graves, and Col. Hodges all provided first-hand accounts of the lessons learned from historical security breaches at mass-gathering events, such as the Boston Marathon Bombing, the New Year’s Day vehicular attack in New Orleans, and the Kansas City Super Bowl LVIII parade shooting.
 

In her opening statement, Sheriff Cordero-Stutz made recommendations for securing upcoming mass-gathering events on U.S. soil:

“The adoption of an integrated communication system is essential. Real-time synchronized communication among all stakeholders, including law enforcement, emergency response services, event organizers, and local authorities, ensure seamless information flow and coordinated responses. Additionally, transparent communication with the public is crucial for fostering trust and encouraging compliance with safety protocols. Empowering qualified volunteers and personnel through comprehensive training programs is also a key priority. Regular drills and scenario-based exercises equip staff with the necessary skills to respond swiftly and effectively to emergencies, suspicious activities, and guest assistance needs.”

Davis outlined takeaways from security failures during the tragic Boston Marathon bombing, as well as law enforcement’s response to the attack:
 
“The tragic events of the 2013 Boston Marathon, a terrorist bombing that claimed the lives of Lou Lindsay, Crystal Campbell, Martin Richard, officers Sean Collier and Dennis Simmons, and left hundreds injured and maimed, forever changed the city of Boston. The response to the attack demonstrated that effective preparedness depends not only on planning but also on seamless collaboration and the critical importance of intelligence, cooperation across all levels of law enforcement agencies and first responders. This integrated effort was instrumental in the successful identification and apprehension of the suspects. The Boston Regional Intelligence Fusion Center, the BRIC, served as a central hub for intelligence gathering during and after the attack. As one of the intelligence-sharing nodes established by the Department of Homeland Security, the BRIC underscored the value of integrated intelligence operations and led to broader and national investments in fusion center capabilities.”

Col. Hodges explained how Louisiana’s state and local law enforcement officers responded to the vehicular terrorist attack in New Orleans on New Year’s Day:
 
“Fourteen lives were tragically lost, and dozens of others were injured. This was not a tragic accident—it was confirmed by federal partners as a terrorist attack. [Louisiana Strate Police] troopers and first responders immediately rendered aid and secured the scene. Due to a long-standing partnership with the Homeland Security Investigations, FBI, ATF, [and] New Orleans Police Department, LSP initially took complete control of the team, allowing a rapid stabilization while federal teams mobilized to begin their investigation. Agencies across multiple states worked together to identify and locate other potential suspects. In the wake of the attack and with the Sugar Bowl just hours away, public safety priorities immediately shifted. LSP and partners implemented an expanded security plan and delayed the college football playoff game by just one day, demonstrating the strength of interagency coordination and our shared commitment to public safety.”

Chief Graves highlighted the lessons Kansas City learned from the Super Bowl LVIII parade shooting, and how those lessons impact the security measures the city plans to take at future mass-gathering events:
 
“One incident, in particular, guides our planning and execution of large scale events like the World Cup. On February 14th of 2024, a tragic shooting occurred during the Kansas City Chief’s Super Bowl LVIII celebration parade and rally… The swift actions of first responders and mutual aid personnel whose roles had been expanded based on prior experience, played a vital role in mitigating further harm and provided aid to those impacted at the scene… We understand what is needed to ensure we are prepared for an event like World Cup FIFA 2026… We have two key areas of concern. The first is funding…The second primary concern is detection and counter UAS authority.”

Task Force Chairman McCaul asked about law enforcement takeaways from the Boston Marathon bombing and how artificial intelligence can be utilized for event security:

“I remember walking down Boylston Street in Boston with you, and then we found several disturbing facts. Information was not shared. The Russian report, FSB, that Tamerlan had traveled overseas, radicalized [and] came back––[it] was never brought to your attention, even though you had two officers on the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Then, to make things worse, DHS and the FBI, using Post-it notes, were not connecting the dots on the travel and on and on. And I remember asking you the question, ‘Would this have changed things if you had known about this?’ And you of course said, ‘Yes, and we would have monitored the suspect.’ And, unfortunately, you didn’t have that opportunity at that time. I think since then, we made a lot of progress within the JTTFs with a [Memorandum of Understanding] that requires sharing of the information with the state and locals. Can you speak to the lessons learned from this tragic experience that we went through, and how is it better today? And one final point… you talked about AI and how that can now play a huge factor in these investigations.”

Davis answered: 

“I remember meeting with Director Mahler, who had good intentions on establishing the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and there was supposed to be complete sharing across that organization. But some of the mid-level managers in there kind of pushed back against that, and I think that really was what impeded a really effective preventive measure being put in place. So, as you said, with your help and the help of Congress and the Senate, we were able to change the rules there.”

“Artificial intelligence is extremely dangerous. The benefit hopefully will outweigh the danger as we put things in place to determine what’s legitimate and not legitimate online. But the incredible gains that have been made in going through reams and reams of video and photographs, which is what we did in the time following the incident––which actually led to the capture of these two guys––has improved vastly. The impediment right now is coming to a compromise with privacy rights experts and advocates and weighing that, that cost-benefit analysis between public safety and people’s privacy.”

Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL) questioned witnesses on their ability to mitigate drone threats:
 
“If you had a drone heading towards Hard Rock Stadium, unidentified, etc., and you don’t know what the intent was, do you have the authority to stop that?… Even if you had the technology, I don’t think you have the authority to stop it.”
 
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz answered:
 
“Correct. With that information, no, we would not.”
 
Chief Graves answered:
 
“That’s correct. We do not have authority to down a drone.”

Representative Eli Crane (R-AZ) asked witnesses about the policy and real-world solutions that could address the threat posed by drones at upcoming sporting events:
 
“We’ve got a bunch of big events coming up in the United States within the next couple years, the Olympics, World Cup, our 250th anniversary––and I’m aware that you guys, as law enforcement agents, you guys have been dealing with a bunch of threats for a very long time to include vehicle ramming attacks, IEDs, improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne IEDs, active shooters, [and] cyberattacks. But the one that’s keeping me up at night is the one that we keep talking about up here. And that’s as warfare has continued to evolve the drone threat, and I just don’t think that we’re ready… I’m going to do everything that I can to push for these authorizations that you guys need, but what I can tell you––and I know that you guys are probably aware of this––the federal government moves very slowly. And right now, this type of authorization, to my knowledge, has to go through three committees up here. I was interested, Colonel Hodges, in doing some research and finding out that in Louisiana you guys just passed in June 2025 the We Will Act, which gives specifically trained state and local officers the authority to intercept and disable drones that pose a credible threat to public safety. I think that’s fantastic. I hope that other states follow your lead. Have you guys had a chance to use the provisions under that authorization yet, Colonel?”
 
Col. Hodges answered:
 
“So, in conjunction with our federal partners, prior to the passage of the law, we did it throughout the Sugar Bowl, Super Bowl, and Mardi Gras season. And now that we have the authorization––not at that moment, we’re finalizing our policy and procedures and protocols for statewide compliance and ensure best practices––but I’m quite certain with the landscape of events that are coming this fall, that we’ll be [using] that law to law enforcement’s benefit.”
 
Rep. Crane continued:
 
“Have you guys had any pushback from the federal agencies who typically control the airspace and authorities on with this state past legislation?”
 
Col. Hodges answered:
 
“No, so they’ve been very supportive, and we have a great working relationship with the federal partners. And I think that’s why we were successful over the last several months, both in New Orleans but really across the state. And because we were able to work with them and use their technology in conjunction with our technology, we feel that we have a skill set that’s ready to hit the ground running as soon as we finalize our policy.” 
 
Sheriff Cordero-Stutz answered:
 
“We will be having that conversation in the upcoming legislature. One of the recommendations that I’ve made up here is that, with FIFA and every sporting event that we can, we try and make sure it happens in a dome for obvious reasons. I think that will drastically cut down the threat of drone attacks, but in doing some research, I think out of the 11 different stadiums that the FIFA World Cup is going be held in, only four of them are in domes… Although we’re not host, we have a dome. We’re not hosting a FIFA [venue], but, as you know, the watch parties and the other outdoor events that coincide bring a larger crowd than what’s inside the stadium or domes, so the drone threat is still a challenge even though inside.”

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