WASHINGTON, D.C. –– Today, Rep. Carlos Gimenez (R-FL), chairman of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, led a hearing to examine the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategic port investments in the Western Hemisphere and how these investments impact our homeland security. 

Testimony was provided by Isaac Kardon, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Asia Program; Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; Ryan C. Berg, director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Cary Davis, president and CEO of the American Association of Port Authorities.

In the hearing, members questioned witnesses on how enterprises owned by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could be leveraging commercial port operations in the Western Hemisphere to project power, enable surveillance, facilitate illicit trafficking, including the smuggling of fentanyl and its precursor chemicals, and position themselves to disrupt U.S. military logistics and trade routes during a geopolitical crisis or conflict.

Beyond its activities abroad, PRC state-owned enterprises have also gained significant access to U.S. port infrastructure, creating additional vulnerabilities in America’s supply chains. As highlighted in a joint investigative report by the House Committee on Homeland Security and the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the CCP, PRC entities maintain financial stakes and operational control over key terminals at major U.S. ports and also could potentially influence port operations through dominance in port equipment manufacturing, including ship-to-shore cranes. Read highlights of the hearing below.

Chairman Gimenez asked witnesses to detail the threat posed by China’s control over the Panama Canal, to which Kroenig answered:
 
“It poses a number of challenges. One, to the topic we just discussed, China is shipping fentanyl precursors through the Panama Canal. Second, by operating the ports there, including with surveillance technology, Chinese surveillance technology; they’re using that to collect information that’s going back to Beijing. [It] may not be classified information, but it’s sensitive information that China could use to exploit for an intelligence advantage. China could seek to hinder trade through the canal, which would have negative economic consequences for America’s wellbeing.”
 
Chairman Gimenez continued:
 
“How could they do that? How could they hinder trade? How can they stop it?” 
 
Kroenig answered:
 
“Halting, disrupting trade in a place like that would not be very difficult. I think we’ve seen in other cases where ships get stuck in say, the Suez Canal––global trade really takes a hit. So, I think there are a number of things they could do to hinder trade, such as putting a ship in the canal and not letting other ships go through. So, there’s the economic dimension and then there is the military dimension in the event of a crisis or war. Hindering U.S. naval vessels––that could make it more difficult for the United States to project military power where it needs to go.”

Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Chairman Andrew Garbarino (R-NY) asked about the impacts of cybersecurity on our port infrastructure, especially amid increased threats in cyberspace from China-affiliated threat actors:
 
“Modern port operations rely heavily on digital logistics, AI driven cargo tracking, and automated systems––making them highly dependent on cyber networks and interconnected technologies. If the People’s Republic of China controlled ports in Latin America or even PRC-affiliated terminals within U.S. ports were compromised, it could provide the Chinese Communist Party with the capability to conduct espionage, manipulate global supply chains or even sabotage critical logistics operations in a crisis scenario. In your assessment, how susceptible are Western Hemisphere ports to cyber intrusions or sabotage by PRC-affiliated entities?” 
 
Davis answered:
 
“I personally sit on a DHS Maritime Sector Coordinating Council, where we share threat information across the maritime supply chain, not even just ports, but tug and barge, carriers, and marine terminals. So, we have fora, including the ISAC, Information Security Analysis Center, where we share information about threats across all the players in the chain. Ultimately, I point to the LOGINK example. This was a Chinese-developed software. I am not sure of its status in use at ports around the world, but this is a great success story of U.S. government in partnership with industry, identifying something that carried too much risk that we didn’t want to upload or use in our IT and OT at ports. And so, we stiff-armed it and said, ‘We’re not going to use this at U.S. ports.’ I see that as a great success story in terms of the collaboration with industry and government.”

Rep. Sheri Biggs (R-SC) asked about China’s ability to undermine U.S. sovereignty and our strategic presence throughout the Western Hemisphere: 
 
“The People’s Republic of China’s growing control over strategic maritime chokepoints, its engagement in illegal fishing, and the suspected use of commercial shipping for surveillance and illicit trafficking all directly threaten U.S. homeland security. […] How does the PRC’s expanding influence over global shipping routes and strategic ports, including in Latin America and the Caribbean, impact U.S. homeland security and the Coast Guard’s ability to police illicit trade and trafficking.”
 
Kardon answered: 
 
“I believe that the extraordinary market share of Chinese firms in global shipping and actually across all the verticals that I would include. Shipbuilding prominently, port investments, of course, shipping itself, containers, leasing, etc., gives China a strategic advantage in the modern economic system. […] I for one have studied a lot of Chinese strategist writings about the famous American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, also a leading influence in understanding sea power is something much broader than just naval capability. The naval capability is actually subordinate to the access to markets and the freedom to maneuver around the world’s oceans. The PRC is systematically invested in those capabilities. When we think about Chinese maritime power, I would urge us to think, of course, of their growing blue water navy, but not exclusively. In fact, if we look at where they’re really differentiated, it’s areas like shipbuilding, in overall trade volumes, and in its position in global supply chains and value chains. So, I do think that this poses a broad strategic threat to the United States.”
 

###