



One Hundred Nineteenth Congress
Committee on Homeland Security
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Tuesday, July 15, 2025

2:00 p.m. EDT in 310 Cannon House Office Building

**Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability
and
Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement**

Joint Hearing

“Case by Case: Returning Parole to Its Proper Purpose”

WITNESSES

The Honorable Ken Cuccinelli

Senior Fellow for Immigration and Homeland Security
Center for Renewing America

Steven Camarota, PhD

Director of Research
Center for Immigration Studies

Mr. David J. Bier

Private Citizen

Mr. Charles Marino

Private Citizen
*Former Senior Law Enforcement Advisor
U.S. Department of Homeland Security*

Committee on Homeland Security

Testimony of the Honorable Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II

July 15, 2025 Hearing on the use of Parole by the Biden Administration

Two-and-a-half million people, on a so-called “case by case” basis? The loose application and use of parole to effectively create new immigration entry pathways for illegal aliens who do not qualify to enter the United States legally.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee, thank you for your interest and concern regarding the growth in mass-scale abuses of immigration parole authority, most particularly during the Biden administration.

While exact numbers are subject to debate due to fluid definitions that have changed as convenient to accomplish open-borders goals, roughly 2.5 million illegal aliens were granted parole by the Biden administration, thus making parole authority one of the most important tools in support of an open-borders policy based on raw entries.

In the most conservative reasonable terms, parole was granted by the Biden administration to groups of individuals (not on a case-by-case basis) as follows:

Program / Category	Estimated Number Paroled
Afghan Evacuees	~76,000
Ukrainians (U4U)	~171,000
CHNV Program	~435,000
CBP One Parole	~400,000+
Border Parole (Mass)	~1.2 to 1.4 million
CAM Program	Several thousand
TOTAL	~2.3 to 2.5 million

The statute that provides legal authority for the granting of parole by the Secretary of Homeland Security is INA § 212(d)(5)(A), which provides as follows:

“The Secretary of Homeland Security may, ... in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe **only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian**

reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.”

The language you see bolded above was passed by Congress in 1996 as part of the **Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)**, which was passed on a broad and bi-partisan basis. This language substantially narrowed the parole authority existing prior to the passage of the IIRIRA. The 1996 language narrowed the statutory parole language that had been in place since 1952. Critically, the addition of “only on a case-by-case basis” was the first time that Congress had clarified that it intended that parole NOT be used for groups of people, but only for individual cases, considered one at a time.

Despite that rather obvious limitation, the Biden administration created a series of new immigration admission arrangements without Congressional approval – essentially making its own law – using the parole authority, sometimes explicitly and other times implicitly.

The restrictions added to the parole authority in 1996 have never been fully litigated. Such a case was in process at the transition from the Biden administration to the Trump administration, but the case was withdrawn by the Trump administration and the District Court ruling was vacated and dismissed.

If Congress truly wants “case-by-case” to be applied one case at a time, then clearly additional explicit restrictions should be put in place. My suggestion would be to pick a number low enough that any competent Secretary of Homeland Security would want to be particular with each parole slot. I would suggest something in the 3-5,000 range. At that level, there would be no point in setting up so-called, but misnamed, “programmatic parole” arrangements, as they would reach annual limits so fast that they would not be useful for such purpose.

One might reasonably ask, what about those poor Hungarians facing the Soviets under Eisenhower? Or other such large-scale, but obviously righteous “urgent humanitarian reasons”? The answer to that is found in the Immigration and Nationality Act as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980.

In a situation like the Hungarians following the Soviet crackdown in 1956, the President now has broad authority to set and change the number of refugees that may enter the U.S. in a given year. The President's authority to change the number reflects Congress' determination that flexibility was required to meet exactly that kind of sudden refugee crisis. Thus, such a tool is available for circumstances that meet refugee/asylum requirements, but not just for a general increase in letting in otherwise ineligible individuals.

America is reaping the financial and security costs of former-President Joe Biden's unprecedented and illegal importation of millions of illegal aliens, and we will for literally decades. Parole reform is but one immigration task that requires Congress' attention if it is ever to be set on a proper long-term footing.

I am happy to answer any questions that you may have at this time.

The Fiscal Consequences of Parole During the Biden Administration

Prepared Testimony of Steven A. Camarota
Director of Research, Center for Immigration Studies

U.S. House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations & Accountability

Hearing Entitled: “Case by Case: Returning Parole to Its Proper Purpose”

July 15, 2025

The decision by the Biden administration to parole nearly three million otherwise inadmissible aliens into the country represents a profound distortion of the intent of the program, which is supposed to be used on a limited case-by-case basis due to compelling humanitarian need or because of a significant benefit to the United States. My testimony will focus on the fiscal consequences of this policy. The limited information available indicates that recent parolees are almost certainly a net fiscal drain — creating more in costs than they pay in taxes. This is primarily due to their relatively low average education levels, resulting in low average earnings and tax payments. Their lower average incomes allow a large share to qualify for means-tested programs. About half of households headed by newly arrived immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries receive welfare. Recent male parolees have a relatively high rate of work. However, given the realities of the modern American economy, our extensive social safety net, and progressive system of taxation, allowing large numbers of less-educated people into the country unavoidably creates fiscal costs. This fact should be a key consideration when formulating policy.

Key Findings:

- The Center for Immigration Studies estimates that an unprecedented 2.86 million people were granted parole during the Biden administration.
- The enormous scale of parole during the prior administration makes it very hard to believe that most grants of parole were made on a case-by-case basis as the law requires.
- Educational attainment is a key determinant of income, tax payments, and use of means-tested programs. New adult immigrants from virtually every top parolee-sending country are significantly less educated than U.S.-born adults.
- The average wages of newly arrived adult immigrant men from most of the primary parolee-sending countries are less than half those of U.S.-born men.

- Households headed by recent immigrants from virtually every major parolee-sending country have substantially higher welfare use than U.S.-born households. On average, about half of households headed by immigrants from the top parolee-sending countries access one or more welfare programs — nearly twice the rate of U.S.-born households.
- Parolees are able to access welfare for a number of reasons: First, some have U.S.-born children. Second, those paroled for at least one year are considered “qualified aliens”, with the welfare eligibility of new lawful permanent residents, while others have immediate access. Third, all residents can access some programs (e.g. WIC and Medicaid for pregnant women). Fourth, some states offer welfare to otherwise ineligible aliens.
- In addition to traditional welfare programs, 40 percent of households headed by recent immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries have incomes low enough to receive the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Those receiving the EITC pay no federal income tax and instead receive a cash payment.
- Immigrants from the top parolee-sending countries do pay taxes, including federal income and payroll taxes. However, on average parolee-headed households have only about 47 percent the federal tax liability of native-headed households.
- The fiscal drain created by high welfare use and lower average tax contributions by immigrants from parolee-sending countries is not caused by low rates of work. Working-age men (18 to 64) from parolee-sending countries generally have rates of work that match or exceed those of U.S.-born men.
- By working and consuming, parolees add tens of billions of dollars to the nation’s GDP each year, but this is not a measure of their tax contributions or the benefits they create for Americans. Almost all of the increase in economic activity they create goes to the parolees themselves in the form of wages.

Introduction

The Immigration and Nationality Act remains the country’s foundational immigration law. That law allows the attorney general to “parole” aliens into the United States. It states: “The Secretary of Homeland Security may ... in his discretion parole into the United States

temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien.”¹

It is important to note that the law is clear that it is not a program to be used *en masse* but instead parole is to be granted only on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, those granted parole are not considered to be formally admitted to the country. Further, when the reason for the parole no longer exists, the parolee should be returned to DHS custody, and the alien is to be dealt with in the same way as any other person trying to be admitted into the United States. Center for Immigration Studies Resident Fellow in Law and Policy Andrew Arthur’s publication “Biden Has Paroled In Two Million-Plus Inadmissible Aliens” provides a valuable overview of the Biden administration’s approach to parole.² For the history of parole and the legal framework surrounding it, see Center legal fellow George Fishman’s detailed analysis entitled “The Pernicious Perversion of Parole: A 70-year battle between Congress and the president”.³

Parolees are eligible to apply for employment authorization (8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(11)). Further, after one year, those granted parole are eligible for federal welfare benefits to the same extent as any lawful permanent residents (8 U.S.C. §§ 1613(a), 1641(b)(4)). Due to specific policies and legal provisions, most parolees from Cuba, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Ukraine have much more immediate access to welfare programs.⁴ This eligibility for means-tested programs has important implications for public coffers. As we will see, recent immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries make heavy use of the nation’s welfare system. As a result, there is every reason to believe this will be the case for recent parolees.

Number Of Parolees under Biden

The government does not make it easy to determine how many people were granted parole in recent years. In a recent analysis, my colleague at the Center for Immigration Studies Andrew Arthur estimated that 2.86 million illegal immigrants had been granted parole during the Biden presidency.⁵ He is a former immigration judge and a leading expert on parole and the administrative data documenting its scale. To date, Arthur has compiled the most complete estimate of parole during the prior administration. At some point the government may release its own comprehensive report on the number of individuals granted parole during the Biden administration. For this testimony, I will rely on Arthur’s analysis.

Andrew Arthur's Analysis. His analysis is mainly based on the Excel spreadsheets at the DHS Office of Homeland Security Statistics (OHSS) website, as well as published reports by Customs and Border Protection (CBP).⁶ Based on these sources, Arthur finds 2.86 million individuals were granted parole from February 2021, when President Biden took office, to January 2025, when he left. This breaks down by year in the following fashion: 58,730 in FY 2021; 721,671 in FY 2022; 1,087,267 in FY 2023 and 897,794 in FY2 024. These figures include Afghans granted parole as part of "Operation Allies Welcome/Refuge" following the chaotic evacuation from Afghanistan and Ukrainians released as part of Uniting for Ukraine.⁷ Arthur observes that "Congress largely acquiesced" to these actions, but he adds that Congress "never okayed border releases". His estimate also includes inadmissible aliens granted parole during the Biden presidency as part of the CHNV program for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans.

The Fiscal Impact of Recent Parolees

Educational attainment. One of the largest and most important studies on the fiscal impact of immigrants was a 2017 study by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. That study found that the education level of immigrants is a key factor that determines fiscal impact.⁸ A 2024 Manhattan Institute study also concludes that educational attainment is the key factor that determines an immigrant's net fiscal impact.⁹

The reasons for this are straightforward. Education determines what type of jobs immigrants typically do and their resulting incomes. Income matters enormously because it affects both tax payments and eligibility for means-tested government programs. Unfortunately, it is not possible to estimate the education level of recent parolees precisely, mainly because that information is not collected by the government from parolees. However, it is possible to use Census Bureau data, particularly the Current Population Survey, to estimate the education level of recently arrived immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries.¹⁰ Due to sample size limitations the results for some individual countries reported should be interpreted with caution.

Education Level by Countries. Table 1 reports the education level of recent immigrants from countries that account for a large share of parolees. Again, we do not have a perfect representative sample of parolees. What can be said from Census Bureau data collected in 2024 is that, in general, new immigrants from the countries that make up much of the parolee population are significantly less educated than are the U.S.-born.

As the table shows, while it is not the case for all countries, relative to the U.S.-born a much larger share of new adult immigrants from parolee countries do not have even a high school diploma. For the most part, recent immigrants from parolee countries tend to be significantly less likely to have a bachelor's degree than the U.S.-born. The lower level of education of immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries has important fiscal implications.

Parolee Employment and Income. The first column in Table 2 reports the share of recently arrived, working-age (18 to 64) immigrant men from the top parolee-sending countries who are employed. In general, immigrant men from these countries have relatively high rates of work. However, the second column in the table shows that employed immigrants from these countries earn significantly lower average wages than U.S.-born men. The third column in Table 2 reports income from all sources, not just wages, for recently arrived men from parolee countries. For the most part, new immigrant men from these countries have significantly lower average incomes than U.S.-born men. The

Table 1				
Educational Attainment for Recently Arrived Adult Immigrants from Countries that Sent a Significant Number of Parolees				
Country	<HS	HS only	Some College	Bachelor's or more
Cuba	9%	44%	12%	34%
Haiti	21%	34%	27%	19%
Nicaragua	29%	36%	11%	23%
Venezuela	7%	33%	16%	43%
CHNV countries*	13%	37%	17%	32%
Ukraine	3%	20%	17%	61%
Afghanistan	16%	56%	11%	18%
Guatemala	60%	27%	5%	8%
El Salvador	44%	31%	13%	12%
Honduras	39%	42%	8%	10%
All the above countries	25%	36%	14%	25%
U.S.-born	6%	29%	28%	36%

Source: Oct, Nov, Dec public use 2024 Current Population Survey. Analysis confined to those who arrived 2020 to 2024 based on year of entry question in the survey. Values do not equal 100% due to rounding. *Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Table 2					
Average Wages and Total Income for Recently Arrived Adult Immigrants from Countries that Sent a Significant Number of Parolees					
Country	Men Only			Both Sexes	
	Share 18 to 64 Employed	Average Wages for Employed Men	Total Average income from all	Average wages for Employed	Total Average income from all
Cuba	74%	\$37,647	\$43,487	\$32,724	\$48,578
Haiti	34%	\$61,158	\$61,992	\$40,990	\$41,387
Nicaragua	91%	\$41,731	\$44,767	\$36,963	\$40,373
Venezuela	80%	\$24,843	\$27,915	\$22,578	\$26,193
CHNV countries*	72%	\$34,205	\$38,151	\$29,722	\$37,457
Ukraine	70%	\$57,494	\$58,045	\$56,988	\$57,453
Afghanistan	67%	\$11,933	\$13,777	\$15,225	\$17,949
Guatemala	84%	\$39,970	\$41,245	\$36,593	\$38,179
El Salvador	84%	\$23,821	\$25,428	\$25,958	\$27,170
Honduras	75%	\$20,808	\$24,829	\$22,879	\$26,013
All the above countries	75%	\$33,903	\$36,926	\$30,847	\$36,118
U.S.-born	77%	\$77,653	\$72,989	\$67,764	\$60,596

Source: Public-use 2024 Current Population Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Analysis confined to adult immigrants who arrived 2020 to 2024 based on year of entry question in the survey. *Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

same is true on the right side of the table when all adults are considered. This is not surprising, given the large share with modest levels of education.

The significantly lower average wages and income of immigrants from these countries means they will almost certainly pay significantly less in taxes than the U.S.-born. Income is a key determinant of tax liability. Of course, we would expect the income of parolees to rise over time if they are allowed to stay in the country. However, when we look at all immigrants from these same countries, not just recent arrivals, we still find that their average wages and incomes are much lower than the U.S.-born.¹¹

Parolee Use of Welfare Programs. Welfare use is an important indicator of fiscal impact because not only are the programs themselves costly, but those receiving them generally pay little to no federal or state income tax as well. Table 3 shows that, compared to the

Table 3					
Use of Welfare and the EITC by Households Headed by Recently Arrived Immigrants from Countries that Sent a Significant Number of Parolees					
Country	Any Welfare	Cash	Food	Medicaid	Earned Income Tax Credit
Cuba	51%	11%	40%	33%	33%
Haiti	10%	<1%	7%	10%	10%
Nicaragua	36%	5%	19%	31%	34%
Venezuela	46%	2%	35%	26%	36%
CHNV countries*	42%	5%	31%	27%	31%
Ukraine	65%	8%	24%	43%	28%
Afghanistan	88%	11%	56%	64%	51%
Guatemala	48%	10%	26%	41%	60%
El Salvador	74%	1%	55%	56%	75%
Honduras	61%	4%	51%	45%	51%
All the above countries	50%	6%	35%	35%	40%
U.S.-born	28%	5%	17%	19%	10%

Source: Public-use 2024 Current Population Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Analysis confined to households headed by immigrants who arrived 2020 to 2024 based on the year of entry question in the survey. Values do not equal 100% due to rounding. Cash programs include SSI, TANF and state assistance programs, food includes SNAP, school lunch and WIC. Any welfare includes cash, food, Medicaid and public and subsidized housing. *Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

U.S.-born, households headed by recently arrived immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries have much higher use of welfare, with the exception of new immigrants from Haiti. In addition to traditional welfare, Table 3 shows that households headed by recent immigrants from parolee-sending countries, for the most part, have incomes low enough to qualify for cash payments from the Earned Income Tax Credit

(EITC) compared to the U.S.-born. The EITC is the nation's largest means-tested cash anti-poverty program for workers. Table 4 only reports those with incomes low enough to receive cash payments. Not everyone eligible for the program receives it. However, because parolees have work authorization and valid Social Security numbers it seems very likely that most parolees who are eligible for the EITC receive it.

Putting aside Haiti, households headed by recent immigrants from parolee countries make extensive use of the welfare system and EITC. It may seem surprising that these households have such high welfare use, given that they are newly arrived in the country. But a number of factors explain this situation. First, some of these households have at least one U.S.-born child, who have full welfare eligibility. Second, those granted parole from Cuba, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Ukraine have the same access to the welfare system as legal immigrants do in most cases. Third, as already mentioned, all parolees gain welfare eligibility after one year of residence in the U.S. Fourth, all individuals in the United States, including parolees, are eligible for certain programs such as WIC, free/subsidized school meals, and Medicaid for pregnant women. Fifth, some states offer welfare programs to aliens ineligible for federally funded welfare.

All of these factors, coupled with the large share of parolees with modest levels of education, and resulting low incomes, mean many qualify for welfare. In addition, there is a large welfare bureaucracy whose job it is to help those eligible for programs navigate the system. Finally, welfare costs are by no means the only costs parolees will create. Public education is one of the largest costs. We know that 20.8 percent of recent immigrants form the top parolee-sending countries are school-age (5 to 17).¹² Applying this percentage to the 2.8 million estimate of parolees in the country means that there are roughly 582,000 parolees in schools. In the United States, average expenditure per pupil is \$17,700 a year.¹³ This translates into more than \$10 billion a year spent by public schools on parolees.

Table 4							
Tax Liability for Households Headed by Recently Arrived Immigrants from Countries that Sent a Significant Number of Parolees							
Country	Median Household Income	Avg. Household Size	Avg. Federal Income Tax Liability	Average Social Security Tax ¹	Average Medicare Taxes ²	Liability for All Three Taxes	Average Tax Liability Relative to US-born
Cuba	\$36,000	2.6	\$13,540	\$3,410	\$1,001	\$17,952	94%
Haiti	\$55,238	2.4	\$4,665	\$2,512	\$698	\$7,875	41%
Nicaragua	\$78,408	3.2	\$11,437	\$5,068	\$1,381	\$17,886	93%
Venezuela	\$38,001	3.4	\$4,464	\$3,239	\$792	\$8,495	44%
CHNV countries*	\$40,001	2.9	\$8,591	\$3,388	\$917	\$12,896	67%
Ukraine	\$22,500	2.6	\$8,933	\$4,839	\$1,132	\$14,904	78%
Afghanistan	\$9,000	4.1	-\$3,146	\$1,137	\$266	-\$1,743	0%
Guatemala	\$40,001	3.9	-\$581	\$2,445	\$572	\$2,436	13%
El Salvador	\$34,000	3.5	-\$2,231	\$2,469	\$577	\$815	4%
Honduras	\$30,000	3.8	-\$1,436	\$2,551	\$597	\$1,712	9%
All the above countries	\$36,540	3.2	\$5,161	\$3,120	\$803	\$9,085	47%
U.S.-born	\$81,421	2.3	\$13,502	\$4,469	\$1,189	\$19,159	n/a

Source: Public-use Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Analysis limited to households head by immigrants who arrived 2020 to 2024. Those with negative federal income tax liability do not owe federal income taxes, and may receive cash payments under such programs as the EITC and ACTC. ¹Equals 6.2% of earnings up to the Social Security tax limit. ²Equals 1.45% of earnings. *Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Average Tax Payments.

Table 4 provides estimated federal tax payments for the primary parolee-sending countries. Overall, the table shows that on average households headed by immigrants from these countries generally have much lower median incomes and federal income tax liability. This is less true

for Social Security and Medicaid taxes. This is partly because immigrant households often have more workers than U.S.-born households, even if the average earnings of those workers are significantly lower. The federal tax liability of recently arrived immigrants from

the primary parolee-sending countries overall are roughly one-third that of households headed by the U.S.-born on average. The leading parolee-sending countries make extensive use of welfare, but they also pay significantly less in federal taxes. This makes it almost certain that paroles are a net fiscal drain.

The federal income figures are those calculated in the 2024 survey by the Census Bureau and represent liability, not actual tax payments. Further, payroll taxes are calculated as a simple percentage of earnings. If immigrants from these countries are less likely to comply with tax laws, then their actual payments would be less. However, these individuals are eligible for work authorization, so the overwhelming majority should be paid on the books and thus subject to income and payroll taxes.

Impact on Size of the U.S. Economy. Using the 2.86 million parolees under President Biden as a starting point, it is possible to very roughly estimate the impact of parolees on the overall size of the U.S. economy. Based on Census Bureau data, 59.4 percent are working, earning a little less than \$31,000 (see Table 2). Their labor income adds something like \$52 billion per year to the U.S. GDP.¹⁴

But there are three things to keep in mind about this number. First the estimate does not consider the possibility that adding parolees to the labor market may reduce the wages and employment opportunities or have any other adverse impact on U.S.-born workers or legal immigrants. This estimate does not consider the possibility that adding these workers may complement rather than compete with workers already in the country. Second, the size of the addition to the American economy is very small relative to U.S. GDP of roughly \$30 trillion. Third, although some may call the larger GDP that parolees create a “benefit” or “contribution” to America, it is not a measure of their tax contributions, nor does it represent the benefits they create for the U.S.-born. Almost all of the increase in economic activity immigrants in general or parolees in particular create goes to the parolees themselves in the form of wages — as it should, since they are the ones doing the work. There is no clear evidence showing immigration substantially increases the per capita GDP of the U.S.-born. Per capita GDP is what determines how well-off a society is.

Conclusion

It is understandable many Americans focus on the plight of those who have left their homelands in search of a better life in the United States. But seeing the millions of individuals who arrived at our nation’s border in the last four years, or who wish to leave their home countries more generally, as simply desperate people facing desperate circumstances, fails to appreciate that they are also rational risk-takers who are responding to the incentives we create. By handing out parole in a fashion never before

contemplated at the border or even flying inadmissible aliens into the country, the Biden administration encouraged ever-larger numbers of people to seek entry into the United States, creating the border crisis and pushing the overall level of immigration to levels never before seen.

Elected leaders are supposed to act in the best interest of the American people. By encouraging so many inadmissible aliens to come to the border by misusing parole, the Biden administration created a cascading series of consequences for the American people. My testimony today focused only on the scale of parole during the prior administration and the negative fiscal impact it almost certainly creates.

Prior research makes it clear that by adding large numbers of people to the country with modest levels of education, which parole has done, creates a net fiscal drain — taxes paid minus costs. That said, there is no evidence that parolees are lazy or that most come to get welfare. Rather, the limited data available on new immigrants from the top parolee-sending countries indicate they have lower levels of education than the U.S.-born. As a result, although many work, they tend to have modest incomes and make relatively modest tax contributions. At the same time, the data indicates that they make extensive use of the welfare system. All of this means they are a net fiscal drain on public coffers.

To avoid this situation in the future, parole needs to be used only as originally intended — as a limited program for a small number of otherwise inadmissible aliens on a case-by-case basis. Enforcing the law and sending as many parolees back to their home countries as possible will help avoid fiscal costs in the future. If the huge number of parolees currently living in the country are allowed to stay, so will the fiscal drain they create.

¹ Section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

<https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=prelim&num=0&req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title8-section1182>

² Andrew R. Arthur, “Biden Has Paroled in Two Million-Plus Inadmissible Aliens”, Center for Immigration Studies, June 21, 2024. <https://cis.org/Arthur/Biden-Has-Paroled-Two-MillionPlus-Inadmissible-Aliens>

³ George Fishman, “The Pernicious Perversion of Parole: A 70-year battle between Congress and the president”, Center for Immigration Studies, February 16, 2022. <https://cis.org/Report/Pernicious-Perversion-Parole#2>

⁴ The Afghanistan Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, and Additional Afghanistan Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (ASA) provided the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) with specific appropriations to provide parolees from Afghans with welfare benefits. See also “Benefits for Afghan Humanitarian Parolees”, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2023. <https://acf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/orr/Benefits-for-Afghan-Humanitarian-Parolees.pdf>. The Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (AUSAA) provided funding for welfare for parolees from Ukraine. See also, “Ukrainian Humanitarian Parolees Eligible for ORR Benefits and Services”, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Refugee Resettlement, March 2023.

<https://acf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/orr/PL-22-13-Ukrainian-Humanitarian-Parolees-Eligible-for-ORR-Benefits-and-Services.pdf>. Cuban and Haitians granted parole under the Cuban Haitian Entrance Act are eligible immediately for most federal benefits. See “ACF’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) Benefits for Cuban/ Haitian Entrants”, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Refugee Resettlement, December 2022. <https://acf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/orr/Benefits-for-Cuban-Haitian-Entrants.pdf>. For more discussion, see Andrew Arthur, “The Welfare Giveaway in Biden’s Cuban and Haitian Parole and Release Programs”, Center for Immigration Studies, December 12, 2023. <https://cis.org/Arthur/Welfare-Giveaway-Bidens-Cuban-and-Haitian-Parole-and-Release-Programs>. See also George Fishman, “Parole with Benefits: A million Biden parolees march toward a multi-billion-dollar welfare ‘parole payday’”, Center for Immigration Studies, April 13, 2023. <https://cis.org/Report/Parole-Benefits>

⁵ Andrew R. Arthur, “Did Joe Biden Really Parole In Nearly 3 Million Aliens? A review of the stats – and the Trump administration response”, Center for Immigration Studies, May 28, 2025. <https://cis.org/Arthur/Did-Joe-Biden-Really-Parole-Nearly-3-Million-Aliens>

⁶ The “Immigration Enforcement and Legal Processes Monthly Tables”, OHSS website. <https://ohss.dhs.gov/topics/immigration/immigration-enforcement/immigration-enforcement-and-legal-processes-monthly>. See page 4 (PDF page 8) in “Parole Requests Fiscal Year 2022, Report to Congress”, July 12, 2023, Department of Homeland Security. www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/23_0712_cbp_fy22_parole_requests.pdf. See page 6 in “Parole Requests Fiscal Year 2023, Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 2023 Report to Congress”, April 3, 2024, Department of Homeland Security. www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-07/2024_0403_dmo_plcy_parole_requests_q4.pdf. As he explains in his blog, Arthur’s estimates also make adjustments to avoid double counting.

⁷ DHS Operation Allies Welcome website (<https://www.dhs.gov/archive/operation-allies-welcome>) and Uniting for Ukraine website(<https://www.dhs.gov/archive/uniting-ukraine>).

⁸ “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration”, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.17226/23550>

⁹ Daniel Di Martino, “The Lifetime Fiscal Impact of Immigrants,” Manhattan Institute, September 2024. <https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/wp-content/uploads/the-lifetime-fiscal-impact-of-immigrants.pdf>

¹⁰ The nine countries we report education and other data for in this testimony reflect the limited information available from the Parole Requests reports cited above and Border Patrol data showing the country of birth and the fiscal year of border encounters in recent years. Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Venezuela in particular are included in our list because the Biden administration specifically used parole to admit large numbers of individuals from these countries. However, the nine countries we do report data for do not represent the comprehensive list of all the countries parolees have come from.

¹¹ Table 2 shows that recent immigrant men from the top parolee-sending countries earn 40 percent as much as U.S.-born adult men. All immigrant men from these same countries, not just the recently arrived, earn 57 percent as much. This is a clear indication that more-established immigrants from these countries do earn more than their newly arrived counterparts, but their wages still lag significantly behind their U.S.-born male counterparts.

¹² This is based on analysis of the October, November, and December Current Population Survey for the top parolee-sending countries used throughout this report.

¹³ Melanie Hanson, “U.S. Public Education Spending Statistics”, Education Data Initiative, February 8, 2025. <https://educationdata.org/public-education-spending-statistics>

¹⁴ The figures for the share of recent immigrants employed from the major parolee countries come from an analysis of the fourth quarter monthly Current Population Survey from 2024.



Testimony of

David J. Bier

Director of Immigration Studies

Cato Institute

Before

The Committee on Homeland Security

Subcommittees on

Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability

and

Border Security and Enforcement

United States House of Representatives

July 15, 2024

RE: "Case-by-Case: Returning Parole to its Proper Purpose"

Chairmen Brecheen and Guest, Ranking Members Thanedar and Correa, and distinguished members of the subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to testify.

My name is David Bier. I am the Director of Immigration Studies at the Cato Institute, a nonpartisan public policy research organization in Washington, D.C. For nearly half a century, the Cato Institute has produced original immigration research showing that a freer, more orderly, and more lawful immigration system benefits Americans. People are the ultimate resource. In a free country, immigrants can contribute to their new homes, making the United States a better, more powerful, and more prosperous place.

One legal way for immigrants to enter and participate in US society is parole, an immigration category first created by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Over the decades since then, millions of individuals have entered this country as parolees. Although parole is a temporary status, it allows immigrants to adjust to lawful permanent residence if they are eligible through another pathway, which many thousands of parolees have done. Many former parolees are now Americans and continue to contribute to their new home. It is an essential and important feature of America's legal immigration system.

Congress should:

- protect current parolees from the president's mass deportation efforts;
- reinstitute the parole processes suspended by the president; and
- expand those processes to give more people a viable legal option to immigrate legally to the United States.

President Biden's use of parole has deep historical precedent.

Although President Biden utilized parole in various important ways, his use of parole was not unique. The executive branch has implemented case-by-case categorical parole programs more than 126 times since 1952, when Congress created the parole authority.¹ Here are several noteworthy instances:

- **Parole from detention (1954–1980):** On November 12, 1954, Ellis Island and several other Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) detention centers were closed, and detainees were paroled into the United States. The number of detained immigrants decreased from a monthly average of 225 to less than 40.² Paroles were carried out under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INS promulgated a regulation on January 8, 1958, authorizing this practice of parole from ports of entry rather than detention.³ From 1954 until 1981, "most undocumented aliens detained at the border were paroled into the United States."⁴ Even after 1982, when the use of parole was narrowed, its use continued "when detention is impossible or impractical."⁵ The INS associate commissioner testified in 1964 that closing the detention facilities met the requirement of the parole statute because "it created a better image of the American Government and American public."⁶

- **Hungarian parole (1956–1958):** On November 13, 1956, in response to the failed revolution against communists in Hungary, President Eisenhower ordered that 5,000 Hungarians be paroled into the United States.⁷ On December 1, 1956, he increased the limit to 15,000 Hungarians before removing the cap entirely on January 2, 1957.⁸ By June 30, 1957, 27,435 parolees had entered, totaling 31,915 by 1958.⁹ For context, only 109 immigrants were admitted from Hungary in 1956, and just 321,625 immigrants were admitted worldwide. The Justice Department stated in 1957 that this was “the first time that the parole provision has been applied to relatively large numbers of people.” Several US charitable organizations helped prepare parole applications and assisted in finding housing and jobs for them.
- **Cuban parole (1959–1973):** Starting on January 1, 1959, following the communist revolution, the Eisenhower administration used parole to allow a “small percentage” of Cubans who had left the island and entered the United States illegally. By June 1962, the number of Cubans on parole increased to 62,500. Overall, about 107,116 Cubans were paroled into the United States from 1959 to 1965. Starting on December 1, 1965, based on a November 6, 1965 memorandum of understanding with the Cuban government, the Johnson administration operated daily “Freedom Flights” from Cuba to Miami.¹⁰ During their operation, 281,317 Cubans were paroled into the United States.¹¹ At its peak in 1971, 46,670 Cubans arrived via parole,¹² compared to 361,972 total immigrants worldwide that year. Congressional appropriations funded the flights. In May 1972, the Cuban government suspended the flights, which were permanently terminated on April 6, 1973. The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 made it possible for Cuban parolees entering after 1959, including future parolees, to adjust their status to legal permanent residents after two years in the US.
- **Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian parole (1975–1980):** On April 18, 1975, the president authorized a large-scale evacuation to Guam using parole. In FY 1975 alone, about 135,000 individuals received parole.¹³ Congress funded (partially retroactively) the processing under the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act.¹⁴ In August 1975, the program was expanded to include Cambodians and Vietnamese with special connections to the United States, and on May 6, 1977, an additional 11,000 were authorized from Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos.¹⁵ From 1975 until mid-1980—when the Refugee Act was enacted and replaced the parole programs—more than 330,000 Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians were paroled into the United States.¹⁶
- **Soviet/Moscow Refugee Parole (1988–present):** In August 1988, the attorney general overturned the presumption that Soviet Jews qualified as refugees. On December 8, 1988, he established a “public interest” parole program for 2,000 Soviets each month who were denied refugee status.¹⁷ Parolees needed to have sponsors in the United States and were not eligible for refugee benefits.¹⁸ A total of 7,652 individuals were paroled in FY 1989.¹⁹ About 17,000 Soviets were paroled from 1992 to 1998.
- **Cuban Migration Accord paroles (1994–2003):** On September 9, 1994, the United States and Cuba signed an agreement to pursue policies aimed at reducing illegal immigration,

including the United States maintaining a minimum of 20,000 legal admissions of Cubans per year.²⁰ In order to meet this quota, the United States created the Special Cuban Migration Program to grant parole to about 5,000 Cubans annually through a lottery.²¹ Around 75,000 Cubans were paroled under these programs from 1994 to 2003 (the last year for which statistics are available).²²

- **Cuban Wet Foot, Dry Foot parole (1995–2017):** On May 2, 1995, the US government announced that it would not parole any Cubans intercepted at sea, even if within US waters, but it would parole anyone on US soil or arriving at a port of entry.²³ The INS and later Customs and Border Protection field manual stated that Cuban asylum seekers “may be paroled directly from the port of entry” except for those who “pose a criminal or terrorist threat.”²⁴ Subsequently, the number of Cubans paroled at ports of entry (mainly along the southwest border) increased significantly. From 2004 to 2016, 226,000 Cubans were paroled at US land borders.²⁵
- **Visa Waiver Program parole (2000):** The authorization for the Visa Waiver Program expired in April 2000, so the Attorney General authorized all Visa Waiver Program entries under the parole authority.²⁶ Visa Waiver Program travelers were paroled into the United States from late April to September 2000 (approximately 8 million times).²⁷
- **Family Reunification Paroles (2007–2017, 2021–2025):** On November 21, 2007, the DHS established a new parole program for any Cuban with an approved family-based petition for legal permanent residence. On December 18, 2014, DHS implemented a new parole program for any Haitian with an approved family-based immigrant visa petition if they have a priority date within two years of being current.²⁸ On August 2, 2019, DHS announced it would terminate the program but would extend the parole of current participants.²⁹ On October 12, 2021, it reversed its decision and continued the program.³⁰

The Biden administration’s effort to use parole was not unique in purpose, approach, or volume. There is no basis for describing it as unprecedented or unlawful.

The statute envisions case-by-case categorical parole.

Allowing qualified immigrants to enter the United States using parole is unquestionably legal. Congress established this authority. Section (d)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) states:

“The Secretary of Homeland Security may... in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien...”³¹

In 1996, Congress added the phrase “case-by-case basis,” and some people erroneously claim that “case-by-case” means that the Secretary of Homeland Security cannot designate any categories of people as eligible to *apply for* parole. However, that is obviously incorrect.

1. **The Secretary of Homeland Security must define categories eligible to *apply for parole*.**

The statute does not specify the meaning of “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” so the Secretary of Homeland Security needs to determine *the categories* of individuals who meet those requirements and will be considered for parole on a case-by-case basis. A case-by-case basis means that they are evaluated individually once they establish eligibility to apply. As the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) General Counsel explained in June 2001:

“Designating, whether by regulation or policy, a class whose members generally would be considered appropriate candidates for parole does not conflict with the ‘case -by-case’ decision requirement, since the adjudicator must individually determine whether a person is a member of the class and whether there are any reasons not to exercise the parole authority in the particular case.”³²

2. **Before 1996, categorical parole processes were administered on a case-by-case basis.**

Parole has historically been both categorical and case-by-case. The executive branch has ordered case-by-case categorical parole programs more than 126 times since 1952, when the parole authority was created.³³ For example, the Cuban Migration Accord of 1994 included a case-by-case requirement even though it created a new category eligible to apply.³⁴ This language was also used to describe parole decisions for Cubans in 1980 and Vietnamese in the 1970s.³⁵ If Congress had intended to eliminate all earlier categorical parole programs through the case-by-case language, it would not have used the same language that those programs had.

3. **Congress specifically removed language in 1996 that limited parole to narrowly defined circumstances.** The initial House version of the 1996 law that became the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act included language that defined “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” but that bill never reached the floor of the House.³⁶ This was done in response to concerns that it denied the president “flexibility to deal with compelling immigration situations.”³⁷ Congress also removed a provision that would have banned the use of parole for people denied refugee status.

4. **Congress has repeatedly demonstrated agreement with categorical uses of parole.** For example, in 1966, Congress approved the adjustment of status to legal permanent residence for any Cuban paroled into the United States for over a year.³⁸ In 1996, even as Cubans continued to be paroled into the United States and as the law added terms like “case-by-case” into the parole statute, Congress affirmed that the Cuban Adjustment Act should remain in effect until Cuba has a democratically elected government.³⁹ That same year, it also provided an adjustment of status for Polish and Hungarian parolees.⁴⁰ In 2010, it extended this to include orphan parolees from Haiti.⁴¹ In 2020, Congress expressed support for an ongoing parole program for relatives of US military members.⁴² In 2021, it extended certain refugee benefits to Afghan parolees,⁴³ and in 2022, it did the same for Ukrainian parolees.⁴⁴


The 2022–2024 parole processes were lawful and effective.

When the US government expanded the use of parole in 2022, the United States was experiencing levels of illegal crossings not seen in decades. As part of a comprehensive strategy to reduce illegal immigration, the United States was negotiating with many countries to decrease flows to the US borders.

- *Ukrainian border parole at ports*: In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, leading tens of thousands of Ukrainians to come to the US-Mexico border seeking protection. Initially, Customs and Border Protection paroled the Ukrainians into the United States under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA.⁴⁵ In April 2022, approximately 20,102 Ukrainians were paroled into the United States from the southwest border.⁴⁶ This approach was clearly preferable to them crossing illegally and burdening Border Patrol.
- *Uniting for Ukraine parole sponsorship*: The administration rightly determined that it was even better for Ukrainians not to have to reach the US-Mexico border at all. On April 27, 2022, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Uniting for Ukraine parole process. Through the U4U process, Ukrainians could apply for and obtain travel authorization in Europe and then fly to the United States to be paroled at airports, provided a US-based sponsor pledged to support them. The legal basis for this parole was the urgent humanitarian crisis caused by the invasion of Ukraine,⁴⁷ and no one challenged the action in court. The U4U process reduced Ukrainian arrivals at the US-Mexico border by over 99 percent.

Ukrainians stopped coming to the US-Mexico border after parole sponsorship

Ukrainian border encounters by location of entry, January 2022–July 2023




Source: "Nationwide Encounters," Customs and Border Protection, last updated August 28, 2023.

Note: Data are estimated based on inadmissibles at airports minus the average number of inadmissibles at airports preprogram.

- Haitian border parole at ports: After evidence showed that US-Mexico ports of entry could handle higher flows of legal crossings of asylum seekers, the administration expanded access to ports for individuals referred to them by certain nonprofit organizations in 2022.⁴⁸ Haitians were the most represented among those using this new process. This is not surprising because Haitian asylum seekers had traditionally entered legally at the US-Mexico border until the Trump administration restricted and then eliminated their opportunity to do so.⁴⁹ Some states requested a district court to block this new parole process,⁵⁰ but it did not do so.⁵¹ Within months of opening the ports to Haitians, about 99 percent of all Haitians arriving at the southwest border were no longer crossing illegally.

Haitians don't cross illegally when they have the opportunity to enter legally


Legal Share of Undocumented Haitians Processed at the U.S.-Mexico Border



Source: Customs and Border Protection, "Nationwide Encounters", 2024; CBP, "Southwest Border Inadmissibles by Field Office," 2017-2019.

Parole at ports reduced illegal immigration by Haitians

Haitians encountered either at or between ports of entry, Jan. 2021–Dec. 2022




Sources: Customs and Border Protection, "Nationwide Encounters," 2023.

- Venezuelan parole sponsorship process: Following the success of Uniting for Ukraine, DHS expanded the parole sponsorship program to include some Venezuelans in October 2022.⁵² The main reason was the significant public benefit of “enhancing the security of our border by reducing irregular migration of Venezuelan nationals.” The process initially lowered illegal immigration dramatically. However, because the process was capped at such a low number and there were so many displaced Venezuelans, it did not meet enough of the demand to stop illegal immigration from Venezuela. Due to the long delays in travel authorization that quickly developed, many Venezuelans could not be convinced to wait (despite efforts from some of their friends who did wait).⁵³

Nonetheless, illegal immigration was lower than it would have been without the existing processes because many immigrants were diverted from crossing illegally. The Venezuelan experience highlights the need for Congress to establish durable, permanent options for legal migration so potential immigrants can credibly believe that these options will continue to exist.

The share of Venezuelans coming illegally decreased after the parole option was created

Illegal share of Customs and Border Protection Venezuelan encounters, FY2022-FY2024




Source: "Nationwide Encounters," Customs and Border Protection.

Note: Data are estimated based on inadmissibles at airports minus the average number of inadmissibles at airports preprogram.

- Parole sponsorship for Cubans and Nicaraguans: In January 2023, DHS announced the expansion of the Venezuelan parole process to include Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans—collectively, this process is known as the CHNV parole process. Again, the primary "significant public benefit" the government cited was to reduce illegal immigration.⁵⁴ In December 2023, Cuban and Nicaraguan illegal immigration had reached an unprecedented level, but the parole process clearly and immediately had an enormous and sustained impact on Cuban and Nicaraguan illegal immigration.

Cubans and Nicaraguans switched away from illegal entry to parole sponsorship


Customs and Border Protection encounters by location, Cubans and Nicaraguans



It is not surprising that the Cubans quickly adopted the new process because they had historically always entered legally before the Trump administration terminated their right to request asylum at US-Mexico ports of entry. As with Haitians, President Trump created the problem of Cuban illegal immigration, which had never existed before at the southwest border, by banning the legal way for them to enter.

Cubans don't cross illegally when they have the opportunity to enter legally

Legal Share of Undocumented Cubans Processed at the U.S.-Mexico Border



- Parole through the CBP One app: Alongside the expansion of the parole sponsorship process, the administration introduced a new system where anyone in Mexico could schedule an appointment to apply for parole at a port of entry using the CBP One mobile application.⁵⁵ Given that CBP had been denying asylum to those who crossed illegally, the CBP One appointment scheduling process was the only way for the United States to comply with sections 208 and 235 of the INA, which mandate processing immigrants for asylum.⁵⁶ CBP One had a limit of 1,450 appointments per day.⁵⁷ About 4.2 percent of CBP appointments did not result in parole.⁵⁸


By the end of the Biden administration, the CBP One process became the main method for asylum seekers to enter in the United States. As a result of CBP One and earlier Haitian nonprofit referral programs, over one million Haitians avoided having to cross the border illegally.⁵⁹ Due to the CHNV+U4U parole processes, nearly 780,000 immigrants avoided having to come to the border at all. Most CBP encounters from June to December 2024 involved people entering legally. By the end of Biden's term, in December 2024, overall Border Patrol arrests were 33 percent lower than when he took office.⁶⁰

Biden's parole has led to more entering the country legally than illegally

Share of CBP encounters with persons entering legally at ports of entry

Oct. 2019-Nov. 2024

— All nationalities — CHNVU



Sources: CBP, "Nationwide Encounters," 2024.

*Notes: CHNVU=Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Ukraine. Only includes southwest border inadmissibles except for these countries after the creation of the parole sponsorship programs.

By May 2024—before President Biden's last major executive action on the border and before the suspension of the CHNV program—illegal entries were down:

- by 80 percent for Venezuelans from their pre-parole level (September 2022);
- by 96 percent for Nicaraguans from their pre-parole level (December 2022);
- by 98 percent for Haitians from their pre-parole level (May 2022); and

- by 99 percent for Cubans from their pre-parole level (December 2022).

Several states led by the State of Texas challenged these parole processes in court. In March 2024, judge ruled that Texas “has failed to prove that it suffered an injury-in-fact” because immigration to and through the state of Texas declined due to the success of the parole process.⁶¹ In May 2024, the state of Texas later urged reconsideration in light of new facts, but the judge affirmed this ruling.⁶²

Although these parole processes were categorical, even the Trump administration’s DHS agrees that “potentially eligible beneficiaries were adjudicated on a case-by-case basis.”⁶³ Moreover, the Trump administration’s DHS acknowledged that “these programs were accompanied by a significant decrease in CHNV encounters between southwest border POEs.”⁶⁴

The parole processes were beneficial to the United States.

The parole processes did more than change the categorization of immigrants from legal to illegal. They also eased a heavy burden on Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection, and state and local governments along the border.

- *More predictable arrivals*: For instance, in September 2021, CBP encountered nearly 18,000 Haitians who crossed en masse at a single location in Del Rio, Texas. The crossings overwhelmed Border Patrol’s processing capacity so much that they couldn’t bring them into custody them for almost two weeks. Immigration and Customs Enforcement was required to shift half of all deportation flights to Haiti for two weeks.⁶⁵ Everyone admitted through the CBP One app or via parole sponsorship must plan their arrival with CBP in advance, enabling CBP to predict when people will enter, which could have prevented the chaos in Del Rio but did prevent a reoccurrence.
- *Pre-arrange transportation in advance*: Border Patrol had to release people when its detention facilities reached capacity. Since individuals were released without notice and often without possessions, they couldn’t easily find transportation to their final destination, causing huge backups at bus stations. “We don’t have enough private bus seats to get everyone out,” McAllen, Texas City Manager Roy Rodriguez told *The New York Post*.⁶⁶ Under CHNV, immigrants would pay for commercial flights directly to their final destination.⁶⁷
- *Pre-arrange housing*: Immigrants who entered illegally often did not know if they would be released or deported, so they had no way to secure housing in advance. Under CHNV, sponsors promised to help find housing for the parolees, and the parolees had time to arrange housing before they arrived.⁶⁸ Throughout the duration of the CHNV program, the Biden administration checked in with New York City, Boston, Chicago, and Denver—cities that had chosen to house migrants—to see if CHNV immigrants were

arriving in significant numbers. They were not. In fact, one survey of CHNV arrivals found that only 3 percent relied on local organizations or the government for support.⁶⁹

- Pre-arrange jobs: Another reason why CHNV parolees were likely not ending up in city shelters is that CHNV allowed parolees to immediately request authorization to work. Unlike those who entered illegally, CHNV and CBP One parolees could request employment authorization from DHS on their first day in the United States. Thanks to an act of Congress, U4U parolees didn't need to request permission to start working legally.⁷⁰ Many immigrants in city shelters said they just wanted to work but were prohibited from doing so. "What I want the most is to work," an asylum seeker in New York named Patricia who was not paroled told CBS News.⁷¹ Meanwhile, parolees quickly found jobs and began contributing to the United States.⁷² One survey found that 88 percent of CHNV parolees intended to work once they received their permits.⁷³

As of 2024, about three-quarters of a million parolees were already working in the United States, including 120,000 in construction, 120,000 in hospitality, and 90,000 in manufacturing.⁷⁴

Due to increased immigration from people without traditional visas, such as asylum seekers, parolees, and illegal immigrants, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the US economy would be about \$1.3 trillion larger in 2034 than it would have been without their contributions, and US federal debt held by the public would be nearly \$1 trillion lower.⁷⁵ The CBO also estimated that parolees made up the majority of the workers providing these economic benefits.

The parole processes improved US security and vetting.

The parole processes improved vetting by allowing for more information checks prior to entry and for the implementation of enhanced screening for parolees.

1. Every parolee is subject to biometric and biographic background screening prior to entry.
As DHS explained:

*"There are distinct advantages to being able to vet more individuals before they arrive at the border so that we can stop individuals who could pose threats to national security or public safety even earlier in the process. The [CHNV] parole process will allow DHS to vet potential beneficiaries for national security and public safety purposes before they travel to the United States. As described below, the vetting will require prospective beneficiaries to upload a live photograph via an app. This will enhance the scope of the pre-travel vetting—thereby enabling DHS to better identify those with criminal records or other disqualifying information of concern and deny them travel before they arrive at our border, representing an improvement over the status quo."*⁷⁶

2. *The Biden administration implemented enhanced vetting for parolees.* Parolee vetting includes checks against National Crime Information Center data, Terrorism Screening Dataset, INTERPOL, and other US government sources. The Biden administration improved vetting in two ways: First, as part of the Afghan, Ukraine, and CHNV parole initiatives, the Biden administration also expanded vetting for parolees to include screening against *classified* holdings for the first time from CBP's National Vetting Center, subjecting them to more rigorous checks than other travelers and immigrants to the United States.⁷⁷ Second, it established recurrent continuous vetting against all the same US holdings after the parolees entered the country.⁷⁸
3. *The financial sponsor provided an additional check.* The purpose of the financial sponsor was to provide the parolee with someone in the United States who could help them if needed. However, having this financial sponsor also added an additional layer of vetting for applicants. Approximately 18 percent of parole sponsors were denied by DHS.⁷⁹
4. *All applicants submitted their information online.* For the first time in US immigration history, both applicants and sponsors submitted their information electronically, which enabled DHS to conduct unprecedentedly detailed fraud reviews of these processes.

DHS never concluded there was massive fraud within the parole sponsorship program.


In 2024, enabled by the thorough electronic vetting enhancement in the parole process, DHS finalized an analysis of potential fraud indicators among CHNV *sponsor* applications. This caused the administration to temporarily suspend processing until the investigation was completed.

- *DHS fraud review did not conclude that there was "massive fraud."* Instead, it identified *potential* issues to investigate.
 - o *Repeat sponsors were permitted under CHNV.* The main concern came from serial sponsors who had submitted dozens of applications for potential parolees. However, there was no limit to the number of individuals one could sponsor under the program.⁸⁰ Many of these sponsors were proud of their philanthropic efforts and did not hide them.⁸¹ I personally know a wealthy individual who filed over 70 sponsor applications.
 - o *Typographical errors in big data aren't a sign of fraud.* I have personally worked with large datasets of user text input, and it is universally the case that some individuals enter physical addresses where mailing addresses should be, accidentally replace the letter "O" with the number 0, invert numbers while typing quickly, and make similar typos. Similarly, in the context of millions of applications, some people unintentionally click "yes" when they intended to click "no." These errors are easily noticeable to someone reviewing them in context and are simply not evidence of fraud.

- *DHS did not set a baseline rate for fraud in immigration processes in general.*
There is no evidence to suggest that these processes experience more fraud than other immigration categories.
- *DHS fraud review did not recommend ending the program.* Instead, it suggested implementing additional protocols to better verify the identities of individuals submitting supporter applications and to investigate the problems.⁸²
- *DHS investigated the concerns and found no programmatic fraud problem.* DHS reviewed over 70,000 concerning sponsor applications and referred just six for criminal investigation.⁸³ DHS concluded: “In the majority of cases, these indicators were ultimately found to have a reasonable explanation and resolved. For example, a supporter had entered a typographic error when submitting their information online.”⁸⁴ The Trump administration did not state that vetting was the reason for canceling the parole processes, and it has not identified any fraud.⁸⁵
- *DHS did not find any fraud concerns related to parolees.* The issues it recommended investigating involved US sponsors who would be in the United States, regardless of whether the parole process was in place. DHS review concluded that it did not identify any “issues of concern relating to the screening and vetting of program beneficiaries.”⁸⁶ Law enforcement has no evidence of any criminal threat patterns related to CHNV parolees. During the first six months of the Trump administration, not a single person has been prosecuted for fraud related to the CHNV parole process.⁸⁷
- *CHNV nationals are less crime-prone than the US population.* According to the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, immigrants—legal and illegal—are less likely to have committed serious crimes that led to their incarceration in the United States than the average US-born person.⁸⁸ The incarceration rate for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans is also below the US-born average, meaning they help lower the crime and victimization rates for Americans.⁸⁹

Immigrants from CHNV countries have similar incarceration rates to all immigrants

Incarceration rates by region of birth in 2023, ages 18-54



Sources: Alex Nowrasteh and Michelangelo Landgrave, "[Illegal Immigrant Incarceration Rates, 2010-2023: Demographics of Incarcerated Immigrants](#)," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 994, April 24, 2025.

Note: Rates are per 100,000 residents in each subpopulation.

DHS's indiscriminate deportation of parolees is unjustified and unjust.

Despite the success of the parole processes in reducing illegal immigration and integrating legal arrivals into the US labor market, the Trump administration *immediately* suspended all new entries under CHNV and CBP One—completely removing the scheduling functionality from the CBP One app.⁹⁰ This action stranded thousands of people who had already been accepted into those processes and canceled almost two million sponsorships by legal US residents.

- DHS is increasing illegal immigration by canceling CHNV and CBP One parole. On March 25, 2025, DHS announced it was canceling the parole of all CHNV parolees *en masse*.⁹¹ DHS acknowledges that this abrupt cancellation of their parole will leave many parolees with “no lawful basis to remain in the United States,” thus increasing the number of people in the country illegally. On April 8, 2025, DHS revoked parole for nearly one million parolees who entered legally through the CBP One app.⁹² It did not provide any public notice of the decision, nor did it follow the legal requirement to revoke parole only when the government determines that the purpose of the parole is complete.⁹³ The DHS Office of Inspector General found that DHS had no way to track parolees or confirm their lawful status, yet the department ended their parole early anyway.⁹⁴
- DHS is carrying out indiscriminate arrests of parolees: The Trump administration is carrying out indiscriminate mass deportations of parolees who entered the United States legally under the Biden administration. DHS stated in its notice ending the parole

that it “intends to remove promptly aliens who entered the United States under the CHNV parole programs,” even though this increases the department's burden compared to allowing them to leave voluntarily or continuing their parole.⁹⁵ This is diverting resources away from arresting public safety threats. ICE has arrested and imprisoned:

- a Bronx high school student, Dylan Contreras, who entered legally using CBP One while attending his immigration court hearing.⁹⁶
 - a six-year-old child with leukemia who had lawfully entered using the CBP One app and was attending his immigration court hearing with his mother.⁹⁷
 - an Afghan who entered with parole and had a pending special immigrant visa application based on his long support for US military activities in Afghanistan.⁹⁸
 - a 6-year-old boy and a 9-year-old girl who were paroled into the country with their mother were arrested and detained at their court hearing.⁹⁹
- DHS illegally blocked parolees from receiving any other status for months. From February to June 2025, the Trump administration unlawfully delayed parolees' applications for permanent or temporary statuses to prevent them from getting an alternative status when it canceled their parole en masse in April and again in June.¹⁰⁰
 - DHS has stripped parolees of due process prior to removal. DHS is now expelling parolees through expedited removal without granting them a hearing in immigration court.¹⁰¹ This means that any parolee in the country for less than two years receives no due process prior to removal and can be deported based solely on the decision of a low-level immigration agent. This decision violates numerous provisions of section 235 of the INA, which explicitly states that anyone “admitted or paroled into the United States” cannot be subject to expedited removal.¹⁰² The law also explicitly prohibits applying expedited removal to anyone from a Western Hemisphere country that lacks full diplomatic relations with the United States, which includes all Venezuelans.¹⁰³
 - DHS is arresting parolees and sending them to prisons in Cuba and El Salvador. The Trump administration has already sent parolees who never violated any laws in the United States or elsewhere to Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba. For instance, Luis Alberto Castillo Rivera entered the United States on January 19, 2025, with a CBP One appointment but was sent to a prison in Cuba, even though he has no criminal record.¹⁰⁴ DHS has even been sending parolees to El Salvador’s notorious prison. For instance, former professional soccer player Jerce Reyes Barrios, who entered the United States via CBP One and has no criminal record in the United States or elsewhere, was illegally renditioned to El Salvador under the Alien Enemies Act in violation of a court order.¹⁰⁵

How ending parole fits into the president’s mass deportation strategy

Ending parole typifies the four parts of President Trump’s mass deportation plan:

1. Cancel lawful status or citizenship to open as many people as possible to deportation. The widespread cancellation of parole demonstrates that mass deportation isn’t just

about “illegal immigrants.” President Trump also intends to deport those here lawfully and American citizens. This includes:

- terminating parole for 1.5 million people with parole;
- allowing ICE agents to arrest parolees who still have valid parole;
- banning asylum, and terminating Temporary Protected Status early for Venezuelans, Haitians, Afghans, Nepalese, Cameroonians, Hondurans, and Nicaraguans;¹⁰⁶
- arresting and detaining legal permanent residents and students;
- attempting to deny the citizenship of US-born children of people without permanent residence or US citizenship.

2. Arrest based on convenience rather than threat. Arresting parolees shows how radically President Trump has deprioritized criminal threats to focus on already-vetted immigrants who haven’t committed any crimes in the United States but have made their presence known, making them easy targets.

- On his first day in office, President Trump rescinded the requirement for Border Patrol and ICE to focus exclusively on recent border crossers and public safety threats.¹⁰⁷
- The White House set an arbitrary daily arrest quota, forcing ICE agents to prioritize noncriminals attending hearings over actual fugitives, requiring “quantity over quality,” as one ICE agent put it.¹⁰⁸
- The White House has mandated that ICE and Border Patrol stop creating lists of criminals to target and prioritize the arrest of immigrant workers who are going to their jobs, not committing crimes.¹⁰⁹
- By June, 71 percent of people booked into ICE’s detention facilities this year were individuals without criminal convictions—just 7 percent had violent criminal convictions—and nearly half have no pending charge either.¹¹⁰
- ICE is currently arresting six times as many immigrants without any criminal convictions as they did in 2017—6,000 per week.¹¹¹

In June, 71% of ICE arrests and 67% of ICE detentions had no criminal convictions

ICE arrests and book-ins, June 1-7, 2025

Criminal status	Arrests	Share	Book-ins	Share
Total	8,571	100%	10,195	100.0%
No conviction	6,043	71%	7,041	69%
With convictions	2,528	29%	3,154	31%

Note: The amount is the total for the 7-day period ending June 7.

Source: Immigration and Customs Enforcement via DeportationData.org • [Get the data](#) • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

3. Deport without due process. The treatment of parolees is emblematic of the third aspect of the administration's mass deportation agenda.
 - Dozens of parolees who entered the United States legally were among the Venezuelans that the administration illegally transported to El Salvador in March, using the Alien Enemies Act.¹¹² Altogether, 50 legal immigrants, including four refugees, were sent to El Salvador without proper due process.¹¹³
 - The Trump administration also expanded the use of expedited removal into the interior of the United States, allowing low-level ICE agents to order people removed from the country without a hearing.¹¹⁴ This expansion violated the Administrative Procedure Act because the administration refused to allow any notice and public comment.¹¹⁵ Moreover, it is illegal as applied to parolees who are specifically excluded from its use,¹¹⁶ and it cannot legally be applied to all Venezuelans because their government does not have full diplomatic relations with the United States.¹¹⁷ Yet the administration is subjecting parolees and Venezuelans to expedited removal anyway.
4. Divert resources from more important law enforcement agencies. The Trump administration is redirecting up to Border Patrol, Homeland Security Investigations, up to 80 percent of the ATF agents, 25 percent of the DEA, thousands of FBI agents, and many other criminal law enforcement officers away from their criminal investigations to focus on low-level immigration enforcement.¹¹⁸ These cases include human trafficking, child exploitation, cybercrime, weapons export controls, intellectual property theft, and drugs. DEA admits its agents don't know how to handle immigration enforcement,¹¹⁹ and last month, the FBI decided it needed some of those terrorism investigators after all, effectively admitting it had irresponsibly compromised national security.¹²⁰

The Committee should investigate President Trump's unconstitutional actions.

Although President Biden's use of parole was unquestionably lawful, President Trump has been involved in serious violations of the US Constitution since the very first day of his presidency. President Trump is now attacking the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and the right of habeas corpus. The Committee has a responsibility to investigate these and other abuses.


- President Trump declares that he is above US law. On his first day in office, President Trump signed an executive order that purports to allow him to suspend all US immigration laws, which would deny due process to those accused of entering the country illegally.¹²¹ He states that he has "inherent powers to control the borders of the United States" that supersede US immigration law.
- President Trump asserts the power to suspend the First Amendment. The Trump administration has repeatedly detained individuals, including lawful permanent residents, for exercising their free speech rights in the United States.¹²² The government has been clear that these actions were not connected to any criminal acts,¹²³ and it has

also arrested students for coauthoring opinion articles criticizing a foreign country's military actions, such as Fulbright scholar Rumeysa Ozturk from Tufts University.¹²⁴

- President Trump asserts the power to deny US-born Americans their citizenship. On his first day in office, President Trump declared that Americans born in the United States to people without legal permanent resident status were not US citizens—in direct violation of the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution.¹²⁵ Fortunately, courts have temporarily blocked this unconstitutional action.¹²⁶
- President Trump is violating the 4th Amendment by engaging in blatant illegal profiling. White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller has ordered ICE agents not to “develop target lists of immigrants suspected of being in the US illegally” and to “just go out there and arrest illegal aliens” by targeting people perceived to be illegal immigrants.¹²⁷ White House immigration czar Tom Homan has said agents will use “occupation, location, physical appearance,” and refusal to speak with agents to detain people—none of which, separately or together, imply that someone is in the country illegally.¹²⁸
 - Agents are arresting 1,100 percent more people with criminal convictions on the streets than during the first Trump administration in 2017, nearly 4,000 per week—impossible without illegal profiling.¹²⁹

ICE is arresting 1,100% more noncriminals on the streets than in 2017

Non-custodial/at-large arrests of people without criminal convictions, rolling weekly sums, FY 2017, FY 2025



Note: The amount is the total for the 7-day period ending that day.

Source: Immigration and Customs Enforcement via DeportationData.org • [Get the data](#) • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

- Agents pepper-sprayed and tackled a father of three Marines because, according to Border Patrol's own account, he “refused to answer questions” after agents stopped to interrogate him as he did yardwork.¹³⁰

- Agents tackled a man, and then, when he told them in English that he was a US citizen, they left.¹³¹
- A US citizen man working at a car wash was arrested and transferred off-site, despite providing identification and claiming US citizenship.¹³²
- Border Patrol carried out an operation that involved profiling Hispanic farm workers—something not disputed by Border Patrol—and one court found that these stops are likely violating the 4th Amendment of the Constitution.¹³³
- Border Patrol and ICE conducted those same operations in Los Angeles, and another court has blocked them.¹³⁴
- DHS claims it is not conducting any profiling operations, but it is still appealing the ruling that blocks it from doing so.¹³⁵
- *DHS is detaining parolees, including children, in inhumane and unconstitutional conditions.* It is unconstitutional to detain civil immigration detainees in conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution or are worse than those for criminal detainees under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.¹³⁶ At the end of June, ICE was detaining 57,861 individuals, even though Congress had only appropriated money to detain 41,500.¹³⁷ ICE was forcing people to sleep on floors.¹³⁸ At least 13 people have died in ICE facilities this year through July, already exceeding the total for FY 2024.¹³⁹
 - Here is one detainee’s description: “There was one toilet for 35 to 40 men, who had no privacy when using it, he said. They slept on the concrete floor in head-by-toe formation with aluminum blankets to cover them. He lost seven pounds in six days, he said, because the food was poor and the portions tiny. “It was so bad,” he said, “I used water to drink it down.” Mr. Gomes said he was not able to shower or change his clothes the entire time he was there.”¹⁴⁰
 - One court summarized: One ICE facility “does not have beds, showers, or medical facilities. Individuals are being kept in small, windowless rooms with dozens or more other detainees in cramped quarters. Some rooms are so cramped that detainees cannot sit, let alone lie down, for hours at a time.”¹⁴¹ A person with cancer was being denied access to chemotherapy there.¹⁴²
- *President Trump is attempting to coerce state governments unconstitutionally.* He has issued an executive order that tries to block all federal grants to municipalities that do not allocate their resources to support ICE.¹⁴³ His administration has sued Illinois and Chicago for refusing to cooperate with ICE, asserting that the president can mandate that they do what he wants.¹⁴⁴ His Department of Justice (DOJ) has issued a memorandum requiring *criminal* investigations into state and local officials who fail to cooperate with the federal government.¹⁴⁵ These actions clearly violate the Tenth Amendment, which protects states from being commandeered by the federal government.
- *President Trump asserts the power to suspend due process.* President Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act to remove Venezuelans and Salvadorans without allowing them the opportunity to contest their removability in immigration court. This invocation is clearly

illegal because the Alien Enemies Act only applies during a time of war, and the United States is not at war—according to his own CIA director.¹⁴⁶ The Supreme Court has already ruled that these deportations violated the constitutional due process rights of the removed individuals.¹⁴⁷

- *President Trump asserts the power to order imprisonment without charge or trial.* President Trump’s purpose for invoking the Alien Enemies Act was to rendition people—including some with lawful statuses in the United States—to a mega-prison in El Salvador. For instance, the administration deported a refugee who was vetted abroad and legally entered the United States under the refugee program to an El Salvador prison without charging them with a crime.¹⁴⁸ Ordering someone imprisoned without charge, trial, and conviction is unconstitutional.¹⁴⁹ The government admits that “many” (probably most) of the individuals sentenced to prison in El Salvador at US taxpayer expense have not committed any crime anywhere.¹⁵⁰ The administration claims that they are members of a Venezuelan gang based on their tattoos, but Venezuelan gang experts and US government agencies have repeatedly debunked the idea that Venezuelan gangs have distinctive tattoos.¹⁵¹ Even if they did, that would not remove the Constitution’s requirement that no person can be subject to punishment without due process.¹⁵²
- *President Trump ignores court orders.* When President Trump was caught trying to illegally remove people under the Alien Enemies Act, the judge ordered DHS to stop the removals and return flights to the United States.¹⁵³ DHS chose to ignore him instead.¹⁵⁴ In a second case, the administration illegally deported a Salvadoran man to El Salvador, even though he had been granted withholding of removal by an immigration judge barring his removal to El Salvador. A court ordered DHS to bring him back, but the administration not only refused to comply—it also placed on leave the US attorney who admitted the error in court.¹⁵⁵ This has become part of a pattern where the administration is ordered by courts to stop illegal actions, but it refuses to comply until it is convenient for them or after they are caught violating the orders.¹⁵⁶ Congress should investigate these violations and determine further ways to force the executive branch to follow court orders.

Immigrants—especially legal immigrants—make the United States a wealthier, freer, and safer place to live. The US government should encourage people to immigrate to the United States legally, including through parole. Parole has been an essential component of America’s legal immigration system for over seven decades, and should remain so in the future.

Endnotes

-
- ¹ David J. Bier, "[126 Parole Orders over 7 Decades: A Historical Review of Immigration Parole Orders](#)," *Cato at Liberty* (blog), July 17, 2023.
- ² [Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service](#), *US Department of Justice*, 1956.
- ³ [Fed. Reg. Volume 23 Number 5](#), January 8, 1958.
- ⁴ "[Highlights of Selected Recent Court Decisions](#)," *I&N Reporter*, October 1957.
- ⁵ [Hearing on Detention of Aliens in Bureau of Prison Facilities](#), *Before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice*, 97th Cong. 2nd Sess. (June 23, 1982).
- ⁶ [Study of Population and Immigration Problems](#), *Before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No. 1*, (May 15, 1963) (statement of Mario T. Noto, Associate Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice).
- ⁷ [Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service](#), *US Department of Justice*, 1957.
- ⁸ Page 162, [Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States](#), 85th Cong. 1st Sess. 1957.
- ⁹ LeMont Eaton, "[Hungarian Parolee Inspection Program](#)," *I&N Reporter*, April 1960.
- ¹⁰ "[Cuba and United States: Agreement on Refugees](#)," *International Legal Materials* 4, no. 6 (1965): 1118–1127.
- ¹¹ Charlotte J. Moore, "[Review of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Programs and Policies. A Report. Revised](#)," *Congressional Research Service*, 1980.
- ¹² Charlotte J. Moore, "[Review of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Programs and Policies. A Report. Revised](#)," *Congressional Research Service*, 1980.
- ¹³ [Refugee Admissions by Region, Fiscal Year 1975 through September 30, 2022](#), *Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration*, October 5, 2022.
- ¹⁴ [The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975](#), Pub. L. 94–23, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess., May 23, 1975.
- ¹⁵ Elmer B. Staats, "[Domestic Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees: Struggle for Self-Reliance](#)," *Department of Health, Education, and Welfare*, May 10, 1977.
- ¹⁶ "[Hearings, Reports, and Prints of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary](#)," *US Government Printing Office*, 1980.
- ¹⁷ Ruth Marcus, "[U.S. Moves to Ease Soviet Emigres' Way](#)," *Washington Post*, December 8, 1988.
- ¹⁸ [Hearings on Foreign Operation, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1990](#), *Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
- ¹⁹ [Hearing on U.S. Refugee Programs for 1991](#), *Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary*, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (October 3, 1990).
- ²⁰ "[Migration and Refugees](#)," *Communique between the United States of America and Cuba*, September 9, 1994.
- ²¹ Immigration and Naturalization Service, "[INS ANNOUNCES SECOND CUBAN MIGRATION PROGRAM](#)," 73 No. 11 Interpreter Releases 319 Interpreter Releases, Thomson Reuters Practical Law March 18, 1996.
- ²² David J. Bier, "[126 Parole Orders over 7 Decades: A Historical Review of Immigration Parole Orders](#)," *Cato at Liberty* (blog), July 17, 2023.
- ²³ President William J. Clinton, "[Joint Statement with the Republic of Cuba on the Normalization of Migration](#)," May 2, 1995.
- ²⁴ [Inspectors Field Manual, Part A](#), *US Customs and Border Protection*, 2010.
- ²⁵ David J. Bier, "[126 Parole Orders over 7 Decades: A Historical Review of Immigration Parole Orders](#)," *Cato at Liberty* (blog), July 17, 2023.
- ²⁶ Abigail F. Kolker, "[Visa Waiver Program](#)," *Congressional Research Service*, October 15, 2024.
- ²⁷ "[2000 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service](#)," *Department of Justice*, September 2002.
- ²⁸ "[Implementation of Haitian Family Reunification Parole Program](#)," *US Citizenship and Immigration Services*, December 18, 2024.
- ²⁹ "[USCIS to End Certain Categorial Parole Programs](#)," *US Citizenship and Immigration Services*, August 2, 2019.
- ³⁰ "[The Haitian Family Reunification Parole \(HFRP\) Program](#)," *US Citizenship and Immigration Services*, October 12, 2021.
- ³¹ 8 U.S.C. 1882(d)(5)(A))

³² [“Expert Declaration of Yael Schacher,”](#) Civil Action No. 6:23-CV-00007, *United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, Victoria Division*, June 20, 2023.

³³ David J. Bier, [“126 Parole Orders over 7 Decades: A Historical Review of Immigration Parole Orders,”](#) *Cato at Liberty* (blog), July 17, 2023.

³⁴ [“U.S. Response to the 1994 Cuba Migration Crisis,”](#) *US General Accounting Office National Security and International Affairs Division*, September 1995.

³⁵ P. 38, [Hearing on Caribbean Refugee Crisis, Cubans, and Haitians](#), *Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate*, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (May 12, 1980).

³⁶ H. R. 2202, [“Immigration Control and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1996,”](#) 104th Cong., 1st Sess., August 4, 1995.

³⁷ [“Immigration in the National Interest Act of 1995,”](#) 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 4, 1996.

³⁸ initially 2 years.

³⁹ [Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act](#), Pub. L. 104–208, September 30, 1996.

⁴⁰ P.L. 104–208, providing for adjustment of status of Polish and Hungarian parolees.

⁴¹ Help HAITI Act of 2010 (P.L. 111–293), providing for adjustment of status of Haitian orphan parolees.

⁴² The National Defense Authorization Act of 2020 (P.L. 116–92), expressing congressional support for an ongoing parole program for relatives of U.S. military members.

⁴³ The Extending Government Funding and Delivering Emergency Assistance Act of 2021 (P.L. 117–43), providing refugee benefits to Afghan parolees, explicitly appropriating money for those benefits, and directing the creation of a plan to process Afghan parole applications.

⁴⁴ The Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2022 (P.L. 117–128), providing refugee benefits to Ukrainian parolees.

⁴⁵ Kevin Sieff, [“There are new migrants on the U.S.-Mexico border: Ukrainian refugees,”](#) *Washington Post*, April 2, 2022.

⁴⁶ [“Nationwide Encounters,”](#) *US Customs and Border Protection*, last modified March 13, 2025.

⁴⁷ [Implementation of the Uniting for Ukraine Parole Process](#), *Department of Homeland Security*, April 27, 2022.

⁴⁸ [“Fourth Declaration of Blas Nuñez-Neto,”](#) *Arizona v. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*, November 10, 2022.

⁴⁹ David J. Bier, [“How the U.S. Created Cuban and Haitian Illegal Migration,”](#) *Cato at Liberty* (blog), February 15, 2022.

⁵⁰ David J. Bier, [“Some States Are Fighting in Court to Increase Illegal Immigration,”](#) *Cato at Liberty* (blog), November 2, 2022.

⁵¹ [State of Louisiana v. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention](#), November 14, 2024.

⁵² [“An Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans,”](#) *Department of Homeland Security*, October 19, 2022.

⁵³ Julie Turkewitz, [“She Heeded Biden’s Warning to Migrants. Will She Regret It?”](#) *New York Times*, October 24, 2023.

⁵⁴ [“Implementation of a Parole Process for Cubans,”](#) *Department of Homeland Security*, January 9, 2023.

⁵⁵ [“DHS Scheduling System for Safe, Orderly and Humane Border Processing Goes Live on CBP One™ App,”](#) *Department of Homeland Security*, January 12, 2023.

⁵⁶ 8 U.S.C. §1225; 8 U.S.C. §1158

⁵⁷ [“Fact Sheet: CBP One Facilitated Over 170,000 Appointments in Six Months, and Continues to be a Safe, Orderly, and Humane Tool for Border Management,”](#) *Department of Homeland Security*, August 3, 2023.

⁵⁸ [“New Documents Obtained by Homeland Majority Detail Shocking Abuse of CBP One App,”](#) *Homeland Security Republicans*, October 23, 2023.

⁵⁹ [Immigration Enforcement and Legal Processes Monthly Tables](#), *Office of Homeland Security Statistics*, last updated January 16, 2025.

⁶⁰ [Testimony](#) of David J. Bier, Director of Immigration Studies at the Cato Institute, *Before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration Integrity, Security, and Enforcement*, January 22, 2025.

⁶¹ [“Memorandum Opinion and Order,”](#) *State of Texas v. United States Department of Homeland Security*, March 8, 2024.

-
- ⁶² [“Memorandum Opinion and Order,”](#) *State of Texas v. United States Department of Homeland Security*, May 28, 2024.
- ⁶³ [“Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans,”](#) *Department of Homeland Security*, March 25, 2025.
- ⁶⁴ See footnote 34, [“Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans,”](#) *Department of Homeland Security*, March 25, 2025.
- ⁶⁵ Thomas Cartwright, [ICE Air Flights, September 2021 and Last 12 Months](#), *Witness at the Border*, October 8, 2021.
- ⁶⁶ Marie Banks, [“Not enough seats’: Buses leaving Texas border town packed with illegal migrants,”](#) *New York Post*, July 22, 2021.
- ⁶⁷ [“CBP Releases December 2024 Monthly Update,”](#) *Customs and Border Protection*, January 14, 2025.
- ⁶⁸ Marcela García, [“Haitians are desperately looking for sponsors in Boston,”](#) *Boston Globe*, March 3, 2023.
- ⁶⁹ [“Survey data show the administration’s parole policy for the Americas is a successful model for new legal pathways,”](#) *fwd.us*, January 25, 2024.
- ⁷⁰ [“Work Authorization for Ukrainians—Uniting for Ukraine Program,”](#) *Reddy Neumann Brown PC*, November 22, 2022.
- ⁷¹ Camilo Montoya-Galvez, [“As cities struggle to house migrants, Biden administration resists proposals that officials say could help,”](#) *CBS News*, August 22, 2023.
- ⁷² [“Survey data show the administration’s parole policy for the Americas is a successful model for new legal pathways,”](#) *fwd.us*, January 25, 2024.
- ⁷³ [“Survey data show the administration’s parole policy for the Americas is a successful model for new legal pathways,”](#) *fwd.us*, January 25, 2024.
- ⁷⁴ [“Industries with critical labor shortages added hundreds of thousands of workers through immigration parole,”](#) *fwd.us*, March 26, 2025.
- ⁷⁵ [“Effects of the Immigration Surge on the Federal Budget and the Economy,”](#) *Congressional Budget Office*, July 2024.
- ⁷⁶ [“Implementation of a Parole Process for Haitians,”](#) *Department of Homeland Security*, January 9, 2023.
- ⁷⁷ [“Uniting for Ukraine, Process Overview and Assessment,”](#) *Homeland Security Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans*, November 4, 2024.
- ⁷⁸ [“DHS Has a Fragmented Process for Identifying and Resolving Derogatory Information for Operation Allies Welcome Parolees,”](#) *DHS Office of the Inspector General*, May 6, 2024.
- ⁷⁹ [“Shock and Awe: Internal Homeland Security Report Proves that the Biden-Harris-Mayorkas CHNV Parole Program is Loaded with Fraud,”](#) *Federation for American Immigration Reform*, August 2024.
- ⁸⁰ David Bier and Alex Nowrasteh, [“Biden’s DHS Halting Migrant Program Raises Border Security Concerns,”](#) *Reason*, August 9, 2024.
- ⁸¹ Gisela Salomon, Elliot Spagat, and Amy Taxin, [“Message from US asylum hopefuls: Financial sponsors needed,”](#) *Associated Press*, January 6, 2023.
- ⁸² Julia Ainsley, [“Biden administration to restart immigration program that was paused over fraud concerns,”](#) *NBC News*, August 29, 2024.
- ⁸³ Julia Ainsley and Laura Strickler, [“Biden administration may soon restart immigration program that was paused for possible fraud,”](#) *NBC News*, August 28, 2024.
- ⁸⁴ Julia Ainsley, [“Biden administration to restart immigration program that was paused over fraud concerns,”](#) *NBC News*, August 29, 2024.
- ⁸⁵ [“Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans,”](#) *Federal Register* Volume 90 Number 56, March 25, 2025.
- ⁸⁶ Julia Ainsley, [“Biden administration to restart immigration program that was paused over fraud concerns,”](#) *NBC News*, August 29, 2024.
- ⁸⁷ [“Declaration of Kika Scott,”](#) *Svitlana Doe, et al., vs Kristi Noem, et al.*, July 1, 2025.
- ⁸⁸ Michelangelo Landgrave and Alex Nowrasteh, [“Illegal Immigrant Incarceration Rates, 2010–2023,”](#) *Cato Institute Policy Analysis* no. 994, April 24, 2025.
- ⁸⁹ Alex Nowrasteh, [“Haitian Immigrants Have a Low Incarceration Rate,”](#) *Cato at Liberty* (blog), July 7, 2025.

-
- ⁹⁰ Thomas Graham, [“US asylum seekers in despair after Trump cancels CBP One pp: ‘Start from zero again’,”](#) *The Guardian*, January 23, 2025;
- [“Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,”](#) *Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center, et al. v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al.*, January 29, 2025.
- ⁹¹ See footnote 4, [“Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans,”](#) *Department of Homeland Security*, March 25, 2025.
- ⁹² Ali Bianco, [“DHS revokes parole for hundreds of thousands who entered via the CBP One app,”](#) *Politico*, April 8, 2025.
- ⁹³ [“Opinion and Order Granting Petition for Habeas Corpus,”](#) Case No. 3:25-cv-965-SI, July 9, 2025; [“Memorandum & Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for a Stay of DHS’s En Masse Truncation of All Valid Grants of CHNV Parole,”](#) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-10495-IT, April 14, 2025.
- ⁹⁴ US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, [“DHS Needs to Improve Oversight of Parole Expiration for Select Humanitarian Parole Processes,”](#) July 2, 2025.
- ⁹⁵ See footnote 4, [“Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans,”](#) *Department of Homeland Security*, March 25, 2025.
- ⁹⁶ Briana Scalia, [“NYC public school student detained by ICE: Who is Dylan Contreras?”](#) *FOX5 New York*, May 30, 2025.
- ⁹⁷ Corky Siemaszko, [“6-year-old Honduran boy with leukemia who had been seized by ICE is back in L.A.,”](#) *NBC News*, July 4, 2025.
- ⁹⁸ Madeleine May and Hannah Marr, [“Afghan ally detained by ICE after attending immigration court hearing,”](#) *CBS News*, July 1, 2025.
- ⁹⁹ Hallie Golden, [“Family sues over US detention in what may be first challenge to courthouse arrests involving kids,”](#) *Associated Press*, June 27, 2025.
- ¹⁰⁰ Camilo Montoya-Galvez, [“U.S. pauses immigration applications for certain migrants welcomed under Biden,”](#) *CBS News*, February 19, 2025; [“Declaration of Kika Scott,”](#) *Svitlana Doe, et al., vs Kristi Noem, et al.*, July 1, 2025.
- ¹⁰¹ [“Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal,”](#) *Department of Homeland Security*, January 21, 2025.
- ¹⁰² [8 USC §1225 \(b\)\(1\)\(A\)\(iii\)\(II\)](#) (2025).
- ¹⁰³ [8 USC §1225 \(b\)\(1\)\(F\)](#) (2025); Jennifer Hansler, [“Venezuelan embassy run by opposition in US closes after Guaido ouster,”](#) *CNN.com*, January 6, 2023.
- ¹⁰⁴ [“Declaration of Luis Alberto Castillo Rivera,”](#) *Center for Constitutional Rights*, March 1, 2025.
- ¹⁰⁵ Armando Garcia, [“Man deported to El Salvador under Alien Enemies Act because of soccer logo tattoo: Attorney,”](#) *ABC News*, March 20, 2025.
- ¹⁰⁶ Juliana Kim, [“DHS ends Temporary Protected Status for thousands from Nicaragua and Honduras,”](#) *NPR.com*, July 7, 2025.
- ¹⁰⁷ President Donald J. Trump, [“Protecting the American People Against Invasion,”](#) *The White House*, January 20, 2025.
- ¹⁰⁸ Jennie Taer, [“Trump admin’s 3,000 ICE arrests per day quota is taking focus off criminals and ‘killing morale’: insiders,”](#) *New York Post*, June 17, 2025.
- ¹⁰⁹ Elizabeth Findell et al., [“The White House Marching Orders That Sparked the L.A. Migrant Crackdown,”](#) *Wall Street Journal*, June 9, 2025.
- ¹¹⁰ David J. Bier, [“ICE Is Arresting 1,100 Percent More Noncriminals on the Streets Than in 2017,”](#) *Cato at Liberty* (blog), June 24, 2025.
- ¹¹¹ David J. Bier, [“ICE Is Arresting 1,100 Percent More Noncriminals on the Streets Than in 2017,”](#) *Cato at Liberty* (blog), June 24, 2025.
- ¹¹² David J. Bier, [“50+ Venezuelans Imprisoned in El Salvador Came to US Legally, Never Violated Immigration Law,”](#) *Cato at Liberty* (blog), May 19, 2025.
- ¹¹³ David J. Bier, [“50+ Venezuelans Imprisoned in El Salvador Came to US Legally, Never Violated Immigration Law,”](#) *Cato at Liberty* (blog), May 19, 2025.
- ¹¹⁴ [“Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal,”](#) *Federal Register* Volume 90 Number 15, January 24, 2025.

-
- ¹¹⁵ [“Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of Motion for a Stay of Agency Action Under 5 U.S.C. § 705 to Preserve Status and Rights,”](#) Case No. 1:25-cv-0872, July 1, 2025.
- ¹¹⁶ [8 U.S.C. 1225\(b\)\(1\)\(A\)\(iii\)\(II\)](#) (2025).
- ¹¹⁷ [8 U.S.C. 1225\(b\)\(1\)\(F\)](#) (2025).
- ¹¹⁸ Brad Heath et al., [“Exclusive: Thousands of agents diverted to Trump immigration crackdown,”](#) *Reuters*, March 22, 2025.
- ¹¹⁹ Shelby Bremer, [“DEA special agent in charge of San Diego discusses immigration, US-Mexico border,”](#) *NBC7 San Diego*, March 8, 2025.
- ¹²⁰ Ken Dilanian and Julia Ainsley, [“FBI returning agents to counterterrorism work after diverting them to immigration,”](#) *NBC News*, June 24, 2025.
- ¹²¹ President Donald J. Trump, [“Guaranteeing the States Protection Against Invasion,”](#) January 20, 2025.
- ¹²² Bill Hutchinson, [“What we know about the foreign college students targeted for deportation,”](#) *ABC News*, April 6, 2025.
- ¹²³ Gabe Kaminsky, Madeleine Rowley, and Maya Sulkin, [“The ICE Detention of a Columbia Student is Just the Beginning,”](#) *The Free Press*, March 10, 2025; Michael Martin, Destinee Adams, [“DHS official defends Mahmoud Khalil arrest, but offers few details on why it happened,”](#) *Morning Edition on NPR*, March 13, 2025.
- ¹²⁴ Molly Farrar, [“Tufts student detained by ICE releases statement while lawyers argue jurisdiction,”](#) *Boston.com*, April 3, 2025; John Hudson, [“No evidence linking Tufts student to antisemitism or terrorism, State Dept. office found,”](#) *Washington Post*, April 13, 2025.
- ¹²⁵ President Donald J. Trump, [“Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship,”](#) January 20, 2025.
- ¹²⁶ Nate Raymond, [“Court hands Trump third appellate loss in birthright citizenship battle,”](#) *Reuters*, March 11, 2025.
- ¹²⁷ Elizabeth Findell et al., [“The White House Marching Orders That Sparked the L.A. Migrant Crackdown,”](#) *Wall Street Journal*, June 9, 2025.
- ¹²⁸ Aaron Rupar (@atrupar), “Homan: ‘People need to understand ICE officers and Border Patrol don’t need probable cause to walk up to somebody, briefly detain them, and question them ... based on their physical appearance,’” X post, July 11, 2025.
- ¹²⁹ David J. Bier, [“ICE Is Arresting 1,100 Percent More Noncriminals on the Streets Than in 2017,”](#) *Cato at Liberty* (blog), June 24, 2025.
- ¹³⁰ Julia Ornedo, [“Border Patrol Agents Brutally Detain Santa Ana Landscaper,”](#) *YahooNews.com*, June 23, 2025.
- ¹³¹ Republicans Against Trump (@RpsAgainstTrump), “ICE agents in tactical gear chase down and tackle a U.S. citizen in L.A...,” X post, June 21, 2025.
- ¹³² [“Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Applications For Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Regarding Preliminary Injunction,”](#) Case No. 2:25-cv-05605-MEMF-SP, July 11, 2025.
- ¹³³ [“Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Provisional Class Certification and Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction,”](#) Case No. 1:25-cv-00246 JKLT CDB, April 29, 2025.
- ¹³⁴ [“Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Applications For Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Regarding Preliminary Injunction,”](#) Case No. 2:25-cv-05605-MEMF-SP, July 11, 2025.
- ¹³⁵ Rachel Scully, [“Noem on blocked ICE operations ruling: Judges are ‘getting too political’,”](#) *The Hill*, July 13, 2025.
- ¹³⁶ *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); *Jones v. Blanas*, 393 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004); *Zadvydass v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); *E. D. v. Sharkey*, 928 F.3d 299, 306-07 (3d Cir. 2019)
- ¹³⁷ Julia Ainsley and Laura Strickler, [“Trump’s immigration enforcement record so far: High arrests, low deportations,”](#) *NBC News*, July 10, 2025.
- ¹³⁸ Douglas MacMillan, [“Immigrants forced to sleep on floors at overwhelmed ICE detention centers,”](#) *Washington Post*, April 20, 2025.
- ¹³⁹ Marina Dunbar, [“Two more ICE deaths put US on track for one of deadliest years in immigration detention,”](#) *The Guardian*, June 30, 2025.
- ¹⁴⁰ Miriam Jordan and Jazmine Ulloa, [“Concerns Grow Over Dire Conditions in Immigrant Detention,”](#) *New York Times*, June 28, 2025.

-
- ¹⁴¹ [“Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Applications For Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Regarding Preliminary Injunction,”](#) Case No. 2:25-cv-05605-MEMF-SP, July 11, 2025.
- ¹⁴² [“Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Applications For Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Regarding Preliminary Injunction,”](#) Case No. 2:25-cv-05605-MEMF-SP, July 11, 2025.
- ¹⁴³ See Sec. 17: “Executive Order of January 20, 2025, [Protecting the American People Against Invasion.](#)”
- ¹⁴⁴ Joel Rose, [“Justice Department sues Chicago and Illinois over ‘sanctuary’ laws,”](#) *NPR.org*, February 6, 2025.
- ¹⁴⁵ [“Sanctuary Jurisdiction Directives,”](#) *Office of the Attorney General*, February 5, 2025;
Cities of Chelsea and Somerville v. Donald J. Trump et al, Case No. 25-10442 (Mass. Dist. Ct 2025)
- ¹⁴⁶ Rebecca Beitsch, [“CIA director: ‘No assessment’ US at war with Venezuela amid use of Alien Enemies Act,”](#) *The Hill*, March 26, 2025.
- ¹⁴⁷ [Trump et al. v. J.G.G. et al.](#), 604 U.S. ____ (2025).
- ¹⁴⁸ Verónica Egui Brito, [“Despite refugee status in the U.S., young Venezuelan was deported to Salvadoran prison,”](#) *Miami Herald*, March 21, 2025.
- ¹⁴⁹ Ilya Somin, [“How Trump’s Alien Enemies Act Deportations Violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,”](#) *Reason*, March 19, 2025.
- ¹⁵⁰ Verónica Egui Brito and Syra Ortiz Blanes, [“Administration: ‘Many’ Venezuelans sent to El Salvador had no U.S. criminal record,”](#) *Miami Herald*, March 19, 2025.
- ¹⁵¹ Verónica Egui Brito and Syra Ortiz Blanes, [“Administration: ‘Many’ Venezuelans sent to El Salvador had no U.S. criminal record,”](#) *Miami Herald*, March 19, 2025.
- ¹⁵² Ilya Somin, [“How Trump’s Alien Enemies Act Deportations Violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,”](#) *Reason*, March 19, 2025.
- ¹⁵³ Marc Caputo, [“Exclusive: How the White House ignored a judge’s order to turn back deportation flights,”](#) *Axios*, March 16m 2025.
- ¹⁵⁴ Alison Durkee, [“Judge Boasberg Thinks There’s ‘Fair Likelihood’ Trump Administration Violated Court Order With El Salvador Flights,”](#) *Forbes*, April 3, 2025.
- ¹⁵⁵ Kyle Cheney, Hassan Ali Kanu, and Josh Gerstein, [“Judge reaffirms order to return Maryland man erroneously deported to El Salvador,”](#) *Politico*, April 6, 2025.
- ¹⁵⁶ David Nakamura, [“Trump administration says it could take months to resume refugee admissions,”](#) *Washington Post*, March 11, 2025.

Returning Parole to Its Proper Purpose

Concerns with Screening and Vetting Large Numbers of Parolees into the U.S.

Chairman Brecheen, Chairman Guest, Ranking Member

Thanedar, Ranking Member Correa, & members of the

Committees. Thank you for the opportunity to speak on a topic

of growing national significance—**the screening and vetting of large numbers of parolees into the United States.**

Let me begin by acknowledging a simple truth: the United States has always been a beacon of hope and opportunity for people around the world. Our immigration system, when it functions effectively, strengthens our country economically, culturally, and diplomatically. But when processes are rushed, overwhelmed, or politically manipulated, **serious risks arise—both to national security and public trust.**

Today, I want to highlight **three key concerns** tied to the mass parole of individuals into the United States under programs that often lack full transparency, accountability, or adequate infrastructure.

First: Security Gaps Due to Volume and Speed

When tens of thousands of individuals are paroled into the country over a short period, the system becomes strained.

Resources, personnel, and technology—especially those used for background checks—are limited. Vetting takes time. When that time is compressed, **corners may be cut, or critical data may simply be unavailable from the country of origin.**

In some regions—particularly conflict zones or failed states—**there are no reliable records** to confirm identity, criminal history, or associations with extremist networks. If we are admitting individuals faster than we can verify them, we

are **increasing the risk** of admitting bad actors alongside genuine refugees. This has proven true as fact in very real ways.

Second: Inconsistent Standards and Oversight

Parole is designed to be a case-by-case humanitarian tool—not a large-scale immigration pipeline. However, when used at scale, it becomes susceptible to inconsistent decision-making. Agents and officers under pressure may lack clear, standardized criteria for approval, or may be forced to rely on **incomplete information** and judgment calls.

This opens the door not just to security risks, but also to **claims of unfairness, abuse, or politicization**. Trust in the integrity of our system—by citizens and immigrants alike—depends on consistency and fairness.

Third: Downstream Consequences for Communities

Finally, we must acknowledge the **practical impacts** on state and local communities. Rapid influxes of parolees can strain schools, healthcare systems, housing markets, and social services—especially when local authorities are not given adequate support or warning.

Moreover, if individuals are admitted without full vetting and later commit crimes or are found to have ties to dangerous organizations, **public confidence in both the parole process and immigration policy at large is eroded.** This fuels political division and undermines legitimate asylum and refugee programs.

To be clear: this is not an argument against compassion or humanitarian aid. It is an argument **for responsible governance.** We must ensure that parole programs are

transparent, limited in scope, and supported by the appropriate infrastructure—including intelligence-sharing, biometric screening, and long-term monitoring.

Security and compassion are not mutually exclusive. But one must never come at the complete expense of the other. If persons are unable to be thoroughly vetted, they **MUST NOT** be allowed into the country! We must never put politics over the national security of our country or the safety and security of the American public.

Thank you.