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(Original Signature of Member)

118TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

**H. R.** \_\_\_\_\_

To ensure the security and integrity of United States critical infrastructure by establishing an interagency task force and requiring a comprehensive report on the targeting of United States critical infrastructure by People's Republic of China state-sponsored cyber actors, and for other purposes.

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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Ms. LEE of Florida introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_

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**A BILL**

To ensure the security and integrity of United States critical infrastructure by establishing an interagency task force and requiring a comprehensive report on the targeting of United States critical infrastructure by People's Republic of China state-sponsored cyber actors, and for other purposes.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Strengthening Cyber  
3 Resilience Against State-Sponsored Threats Act”.

4 **SEC. 2. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE AND REPORT ON THE**

5 **TARGETING OF UNITED STATES CRITICAL IN-**  
6 **FRASTRUCTURE BY PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF**  
7 **CHINA STATE-SPONSORED CYBER ACTORS.**

8 (a) INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE.—Not later than 120  
9 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-  
10 retary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director  
11 of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
12 (CISA) of the Department of Homeland Security, in con-  
13 sultation with the Attorney General, the Director of the  
14 Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the heads of appro-  
15 priate Sector Risk Management Agencies as determined  
16 by the Director of CISA, shall establish a joint interagency  
17 task force (in this section referred to as the “task force”)  
18 to facilitate collaboration and coordination among the Sec-  
19 tor Risk Management Agencies assigned a Federal role or  
20 responsibility in National Security Memorandum–22,  
21 issued April 30, 2024 (relating to critical infrastructure  
22 security and resilience), or any successor document, to de-  
23 tect, analyze, and respond to the cybersecurity threat  
24 posed by state-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt Ty-  
25 phoon, of the People’s Republic of China by ensuring that

1 such agencies' actions are aligned and mutually rein-  
2 forcing.

3 (b) CHAIRS.—

4 (1) CHAIRPERSON.—The Director of CISA (or  
5 the Director of CISA's designee) shall serve as the  
6 chairperson of the task force.

7 (2) VICE CHAIRPERSON.—The Director of the  
8 Federal Bureau of Investigation (or such Director's  
9 designee) shall serve as the vice chairperson of the  
10 task force.

11 (c) COMPOSITION.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The task force shall consist  
13 of appropriate representatives of the departments  
14 and agencies specified in subsection (a).

15 (2) QUALIFICATIONS.—To materially assist in  
16 the activities of the task force, representatives under  
17 paragraph (1) should be subject matter experts who  
18 have familiarity and technical expertise regarding cy-  
19 bersecurity, digital forensics, or threat intelligence  
20 analysis, or in-depth knowledge of the tactics, tech-  
21 niques, and procedures (TTPs) commonly used by  
22 state-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt Ty-  
23 phoon, of the People's Republic of China.

1       (d) VACANCY.—Any vacancy occurring in the mem-  
2 bership of the task force shall be filled in the same manner  
3 in which the original appointment was made.

4       (e) ESTABLISHMENT FLEXIBILITY.—To avoid redun-  
5 dancy, the task force may coordinate with any preexisting  
6 task force, working group, or cross-intelligence effort with-  
7 in the Homeland Security Enterprise or the intelligence  
8 community that has examined or responded to the cyberse-  
9 curity threat posed by state-sponsored cyber actors, in-  
10 cluding Volt Typhoon, of the People's Republic of China.

11       (f) TASK FORCE REPORTS; BRIEFING.—

12           (1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 540 days  
13 after the establishment of the task force, the task  
14 force shall submit to the appropriate congressional  
15 committees the first report containing the initial  
16 findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the  
17 task force.

18           (2) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than one year  
19 after the date of the submission of the initial report  
20 under paragraph (1) and annually thereafter for five  
21 years, the task force shall submit to the appropriate  
22 congressional committees an annual report con-  
23 taining the findings, conclusions, and recomenda-  
24 tions of the task force.

3 (A) An assessment at the lowest classifica-  
4 tion feasible of the sector-specific risks, trends  
5 relating to incidents impacting sectors, and tac-  
6 tics, techniques, and procedures utilized by or  
7 relating to state-sponsored cyber actors, includ-  
8 ing Volt Typhoon, of the People's Republic of  
9 China.

10 (B) An assessment of additional resources  
11 and authorities needed by Federal departments  
12 and agencies to better counter the cybersecurity  
13 threat posed by state-sponsored cyber actors,  
14 including Volt Typhoon, of the People's Repub-  
15 lic of China .

16 (C) A classified assessment of the extent of  
17 potential destruction, compromise, or disruption  
18 to United States critical infrastructure by state-  
19 sponsored cyber actors, including Volt Typhoon,  
20 of the People's Republic of China in the event  
21 of a major crisis or future conflict between the  
22 People's Republic of China and the United  
23 States.

24 (D) A classified assessment of the ability  
25 of the United States to counter the cybersecurity

9 (E) A classified assessment of the ability  
10 of state-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt  
11 Typhoon, of the People's Republic of China to  
12 disrupt operations of the United States Armed  
13 Forces by hindering mobility across critical in-  
14 frastructure such as rail, aviation, and ports,  
15 including how such would impair the ability of  
16 the United States Armed Forces to deploy and  
17 maneuver forces effectively.

18 (F) A classified assessment of the eco-  
19 nomic and social ramifications of a disruption  
20 to one or multiple United States critical infra-  
21 structure sectors by state-sponsored cyber ac-  
22 tors, including Volt Typhoon, of the People's  
23 Republic of China in the event of a major crisis  
24 or future conflict between the People's Republic  
25 of China and the United States.

1 (G) Such recommendations as the task  
2 force may have for the Homeland Security En-  
3 terprise, the intelligence community, or critical  
4 infrastructure owners and operators to improve  
5 the detection and mitigation of the cybersecurity  
6 threat posed by state-sponsored cyber ac-  
7 tors, including Volt Typhoon, of the People's  
8 Republic of China.

9 (H) A one-time plan for an awareness  
10 campaign to familiarize critical infrastructure  
11 owners and operators with security resources  
12 and support offered by Federal departments  
13 and agencies to mitigate the cybersecurity  
14 threat posed by state-sponsored cyber actors,  
15 including Volt Typhoon, of the People's Repub-  
16 lic of China.

23 (5) FORM.—Each report under this subsection  
24 shall be submitted in classified form, consistent with

1       the protection of intelligence sources and methods,  
2       but may include an unclassified executive summary.

3           (6) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified executive  
4       summary of each report required under this sub-  
5       section shall be published on a publicly accessible  
6       website of the Department of Homeland Security.

7           (g) ACCESS TO INFORMATION.—

8           (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Homeland  
9       Security, the Director of CISA, the Attorney Gen-  
10       eral, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-  
11       tigation, and the heads of appropriate Sector Risk  
12       Management Agencies, as determined by the Direc-  
13       tor of CISA, shall provide to the task force such in-  
14       formation, documents, analysis, assessments, find-  
15       ings, evaluations, inspections, audits, or reviews re-  
16       lating to efforts to counter the cybersecurity threat  
17       posed by state-sponsored cyber actors, including Volt  
18       Typhoon, of the People's Republic of China as the  
19       task force considers necessary to carry out this sec-  
20       tion.

21           (2) RECEIPT, HANDLING, STORAGE, AND DIS-  
22       SEMINATION.—Information, documents, analysis, as-  
23       sessments, findings, evaluations, inspections, audits,  
24       and reviews described in this subsection shall be re-  
25       ceived, handled, stored, and disseminated only by

1       members of the task force consistent with all appli-  
2       cable statutes, regulations, and executive orders.

3               (3) SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR TASK FORCE  
4        MEMBERS.—No member of the task force may be  
5        provided with access to classified information under  
6        this section without the appropriate security clear-  
7        ances.

8               (h) TERMINATION.—The task force, and all the au-  
9        thorities of this section, shall terminate on the date that  
10      is 60 days after the final briefing required under sub-  
11      section (h)(4).

12               (i) EXEMPTION FROM FACA.—Chapter 10 of title  
13      5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the “Fed-  
14      eral Advisory Committee Act”), shall not apply to the task  
15      force.

16               (j) EXEMPTION FROM PAPERWORK REDUCTION  
17      ACT.—Chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code (com-  
18      monly known as the “Paperwork Reduction Act”), shall  
19      not apply to the task force.

20               (k) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

21                       (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
22      TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
23      mittees” means—

24                       (A) the Committee on Homeland Security,  
25                       the Committee on Judiciary, and the Select

1 Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-  
2 resentatives; and

10 (8) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term  
11 “intelligence community” has the meaning given  
12 such term in section 3(4) of the National Security  
13 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

1 (11) SECTOR RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY.—

2 The term “Sector Risk Management Agency” has  
3 the meaning given such term in section 2200 of the  
4 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650).

11 (13) SYSTEMS.—The term “systems” means a  
12 combination of personnel, structures, facilities, infor-  
13 mation, materials, equipment, networks, or proc-  
14 esses, whether physical or virtual, integrated or  
15 interconnected for a specific purpose that enables an  
16 organization’s services, functions, or capabilities.

17 (14) UNITED STATES.—The term “United  
18 States”, when used in a geographic sense, means  
19 any State of the United States.

20 (15) VOLT TYPHOON.—The term “Volt Ty-  
21 phoon” means the People’s Republic of China state-  
22 sponsored cyber actor described in the Cybersecurity  
23 and Infrastructure Security Agency cybersecurity  
24 advisory entitled “PRC State-Sponsored Actors  
25 Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S.

1        Critical Infrastructure”, issued on February 07,  
2        2024, or any successor advisory.