The enormous devastation that would result if terrorists use a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials successfully in a terrorist act requires us to do all we can to prevent them from entering or moving through the United States.

The detection of special nuclear materials being smuggled or otherwise transported into or through the United States is the main mission of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and it has a further function in the development of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. DNDO also plays a role in nuclear forensics and security of radiological materials.

DNDO is one of the major directorates within the Department, and the two key projects in the nuclear detection area are the deployment of current generation Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) and the development of the next generations of detection devices. And I understand we are going to hear some new developments in today’s testimony from Mr. Stern, especially concerning the ASP program.

At the end of March of this year, DNDO met with its interagency partners in the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of National Intelligence, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice and State, to conduct a joint review of the performance goals identified in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Strategic Plan.

I commend Director Stern, for his energetic efforts to produce the GNDA Strategy by the end of 2010, and for moving quickly on the Joint Annual Interagency Review that was delivered to us just a few weeks ago.

It was obvious we needed a strategy, and this Subcommittee is glad DNDO was able to put the very complex Interagency Review together quickly and cooperatively.

DNDO now has responsibility for implementing the domestic portion of the plan, and I am anxious to see progress on a rubber-meets-the-road plan.

Additionally, I have noted that DNDO has revisited some past assumptions that guided development of a global nuclear detection strategy—particularly assumptions related to threat intelligence—resulting in the concept that immobility is not a desirable characteristic among nuclear and radiological detection devices.

It is important that this plan anticipate a new focus on state and local resources, which become critical to providing ‘surge’ capabilities in specific regions.

I understand that part of what we will hear today will give us insight into this concept of ‘surging large numbers of people and devices’, and communicating and synthesizing information very rapidly in detecting nuclear material or weapons, and even more importantly, that the Architecture Strategy involves reliance on a massive numbers of state and local officials to address nuclear or radiological threats.

My concern is how do we plan for a complex system like this when we are anticipating a billion-dollar cut in the Department’s budget, which will drastically reduce the capabilities of state and local authorities, who depend heavily on DHS grants, and are already stressed under their own considerable state and local workloads.
I will be listening carefully to today’s testimony for any indication that planning for the GNDA is taking into consideration the very real possibility that huge budget cuts proposed in this year’s Appropriations would be approved in the House of Representatives.

Agencies, and especially DNDO, must be fully aware of what implementation goals would look like under these proposed draconian cuts to our national nuclear detection apparatus.

In conclusion, the production of the GNDA Strategic Plan has afforded Members of the Subcommittee and DHS leadership a new opportunity to look at the ways DNDO could best fulfill its mission.

In order to prevent the unthinkable, we must deploy the best technology, employ the best people, and do the best planning. And I repeat, in these times of severe budget cutbacks, our planning must reflect how we propose to accomplish our national security goals in nuclear detection with harshly restricted assistance to our state and local partners.