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Securing Our Nation's Mass Transit Systems
Against a Terrorist Attack

Good morning, Chairman King, ranking member Thompson and members of the Committee on Homeland Security. My name is Dan Hartwig and I am a Deputy Chief of Police for Operations at the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District Police Department, also known as BART.

On behalf of BART's Board of Directors, our 3,500 employees and our 350,000 daily riders, I appreciate being given the opportunity to testify before you today.

BART's role as the backbone of the region's transportation network is borne out both by what happens on a normal weekday and by what happens when circumstances are atypical.

A normal weekday for BART means providing on-time service for about 350,000 Bay Area residents across 105 miles of track, 44 stations in 4 counties and 26 cities.

Most often, as a law enforcement agency we provide a safe and secure environment for those within our system. The most recent atypical day we experienced was November 3, 2010 when BART system carried 522,200 customers to the San Francisco Giant's World Series Championship victory parade. The presence of large crowds traveling through the BART facilities for special events, such as the Giant's celebration, presents a predictable, target-rich environment for terror attacks and magnifies the risk and consequence of a terror attack that transit systems face daily.

The attack in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004, the attacks in London, England on July 7 and 21, 2005 and the attack in Mumbai, India on November 26, 2008 illustrate with alarming clarity the vulnerability of public transit facilities. The United States Department of Homeland Security warns that the nation's mass transit systems, which are considered to be part of America's "critical infrastructure," are at high risk of being targeted by terrorists for mass casualty attacks.

Soon after September 11th, 2001 BART's administration aggressively focused upon identifying targets vulnerable to acts of terrorism in the BART system. After completing four threat/vulnerability assessments with three government agencies and one private security firm, early on BART identified a need to complete an estimated \$250 million in security projects. Recognizing it's most critical and vulnerable asset, BART immediately invested capital funds to begin the hardening process.

On Friday, July 8th, 2005 representatives from TSA knocked on BART's door offering partnership and support in the wake to the tragic attack on London's transportation systems thus beginning our partnership that continues to this day.

Beginning in 2003 and continuing through 2005, Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) dollars helped to fund the specific projects to further harden the critical infrastructure of the BART system.

Receiving Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) funds in 2006 through 2010 has allowed for the expansion of these security projects to address the identified security needs of other vulnerable critical assets.

Today we continue to use Transit Security Grant Program funds, as well as other Local, State and Federal funds, to strategically and methodically eliminate identified vulnerabilities from the previously mentioned threat/vulnerability assessments.

The engineering challenges to protect and mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack have been greater than originally imagined. Understanding the required expertise needed, we have, and continue to, rely upon the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration for support and direction. Without their unwavering commitment to BART specifically, and to our allied transportation systems, our ability to achieve success would be extremely limited.

Due to the unique environment in which our system is located, the complexity of the security projects has exceeded our local resources and it is the support from DHS and TSA that enables us to move these security projects forward.

As for passenger screening, from the beginning, it was clear that the post 9-11 security measures that were developed for airports would not work in the subway systems of America. BART is Bay Area RAPID Transit and if we lose the rapid, we cease to serve our customers and the region. Although BART is a fairly new system, our infrastructure was not designed to accommodate the space and equipment required to screen large numbers of passengers and current technology cannot process large numbers of passengers quickly enough for the mass transit environment.

Further proof of the successes brought to us by DHS and TSA are the following projects and programs;

- Financial support for major capital projects to harden BART's critical infrastructure
- TSA Explosives Detection K9 Program
- Operational Pack funding the Critical Asset Patrol Team assigned to the critical asset corridor
- Training for BART's frontline employees on terrorism awareness and identification
- Visible Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR) teams partnering with BART police officers to patrol critical assets and special events
- RailSafe, linking transit agencies across the country on the same date and time focusing on "high visibility" within our properties

I would implore to you today, the funding source for Transportation agencies to solidify their properties is needed now more than ever. We have failed in the past to pay close attention to a threat that was considered foreign. We now know the same threat exist in our own homeland.

As we approach the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, we cannot allow complacency to undermine our efforts to keep America secure. Chairman King, ranking member Thompson and members of the Committee on Homeland Security: On behalf of BART Police Chief Kenton

Rainey and the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, thank you for inviting me to testify today, I can now answer any questions you may have.