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**House Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response and Communications**
**“Ensuring the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Transparency of Homeland Security Grants
(Part II): Stakeholder Perspectives”**

Thursday, April 26th, 2012

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to represent the New York City Police Department before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response and Communications. For the record, my name is Richard Daddario. I am the Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism in the New York City Police Department.

My prepared remarks address this Committee's interest in the proposal in the President's Fiscal Year 2013 budget request to consolidate grant programs into a new National Preparedness Grant Program. As you know, New York City is committed to the fight against terrorism and commits enormous resources towards security. Twice attacked, often threatened, we could not do otherwise, but we cannot go it alone. The NYPD relies heavily on DHS federal grants to support critical counterterrorism programs, terrorism investigations, and high-visibility operational deployments.

DHS grant funding has played a crucial role in helping the NYPD carry out its mission of keeping New York City safe. For this reason, any time significant changes to the FEMA grant process are proposed, we at the NYPD want to be a part of the discussion.

Today, I will touch on a few concerns we have about the President's Fiscal Year 2013 budget request and the vision for the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP).

First, it is important that a clear line be drawn between funding to address terrorism and funding related to other risks, which are commonly referred to as all-hazards. On this issue, we think the focus must remain on *terrorism*, rather than other hazards. Given the threats New York City and the rest of the country continue to face, it is necessary to provide high-risk municipalities with targeted counterterrorism dollars. For this reason, it is absolutely essential that the newly formed DHS grant program remain aligned with the 9/11 Act's objective of providing federal grant funds to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.

Having said that, you will understand why we urge you to maintain the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). It is necessary to have a standalone program that provides the highest risk urban areas with targeted funding. That is what UASI does. It directs the limited homeland security grant funds available to the *programs* that are most effective; and the *cities* that are most at risk.

Moreover, the existing UASI governance framework works well and already reflects the principles of the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment. The UASI framework builds and sustains region-wide capabilities: the framework ensures that capabilities are cross-jurisdictional, readily deployable, and multi-purpose.

I will shift now to a couple of process issues, beginning with grant periods where a rigid 24-month period is under consideration. Grant periods must balance the goal of efficiency with the need for flexibility. Building and sustaining capabilities involves long-term commitments. Grant cycles of two years with limited to no extensions are not realistic. They will prevent jurisdictions from undertaking innovative, multi-year projects.

It is important to note that in many instances, municipal procurement rules require the agency to have the funding in-hand before they can even *begin* the contracting process. And, procurement processes can take up to a year to complete. Moreover, a 24-month period will encourage municipalities to pay vendors the full value of any contract upfront. This will not allow agencies to responsibly manage their vendors and contracts. For these reasons, it is imperative that the grant period remain at 36 months, with extensions provided as necessary and justified.

The next process issue relates to bureaucratic delay. Congress should seek to minimize the layers of bureaucracy involved in administering DHS grant programs. These layers of bureaucracy create unnecessary costs and delay. For example, today, the NYPD must go through two intermediaries before investment justifications for key security projects even get to FEMA. And FEMA's responses must go through the same burdensome channels before they reach the NYPD. These layers can result in months and months worth of delay on some of the most straightforward issues.

Finally, I want to make a pitch for operational programs. To the extent that Congress chooses to continue to set aside funding specific to port and transit asset protection, it is essential that these dollars not be limited to capital programs, but include operational programs as well.

Often, the agency charged with providing for safety and security of a transit or port asset is not the agency responsible for the capital projects associated with it. Take for example the New York City subway system. The NYPD has been responsible for safety and security of subway for nearly two decades. Yet it is the MTA, not the NYPD, which owns and oversees capital programs associated with MTA facilities.

Thank you. I would be happy to answer any of your questions.